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Issue Preclusion in Products Liability 
M. Stuart Madden? 
I. Introduction 
Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel,' is one of 
several doctrines intended to secure finality in dispute resolu- 
tion.' When raised between or among parties, or their privies, 
who were bound by an earlier judgments on a similar subject 
matter,' issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating an 
issue necessarily and finally decided. in the earlier action.Then 
f Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A., University of Pennsylva- 
nia; M.A., London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., Georgetown Univer- 
sity Law Center. 
' 1. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments and a growing number of contemporary 
decisions demonstrate the preference for the term "issue preclusion" over the older usage 
"collateral estoppel." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS $3 26-29 (1982); See, e.g., 
Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311, 315 (D.N.J. 1989) (citations omitted) 
("[Tlhe terms 'claim preclusion' and 'issue preclusion' will be used. The term claim pre- 
clusion replaces res judicata, the term issue preclusion replaces collateral estoppel."). 
2. A primary list of such common law and procedural devices includes the doctrine 
of res judicata, or claim preclusion, from which the rule of issue preclusion derives; the 
rules liberalizing amendment of pleadings; the constructive conformance of pleadings 
with claims proved at trial, the rules of permissive and compulsory joinder of parties; 
and the rules governing class actions and those giving structure to multi-district litiga- 
tion. Cf. Scott v. Monsanto Co., 868 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing issue preclusion 
as a sanction availcble under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for willful or bad faith 
noncompliance with discovery requests). 
3. In such circumstances, "mutuality" is said to exist between the parties to the 
earlier action and the parties of the later suit in which issue preclusion is asserted. 
4. Issue identity, and not subject matter similarity, is the gravamen of issue preclu- 
sion. Where, however, nonmutual issue preclusion is asserted, the party opponent's op- 
portunity and incentive to litigate the issue in the earlier action can be determinative in 
resolving the appropriateness of reliance upon the earlier disposition. An arguably iden- 
tical issue decided in an earlier action on a quite different .subject matter will bolste'r the 
opponent's argument that the prior suit provided a distinguishable opportunity and 
lesser incentive to litigate the issue in question. 
5. See, e.g., In  re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744, 746 (E.D. Mich. 
1990) ("The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that an actual and necessary deter- 
mination of an issue by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive in subsequent 
cases based upon a different cause of action but involving a party to the prior litiga- 
tion.") (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)); Goodson V. 
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raised by a party who played no role in the earlier adjudication," 
the court may estop litigation of an issue where, balancing the 
goal of judicial economy against the consideration of fairness to 
the parties, it concludes that the issue has already been fully 
and finally determined.7 
Modern application of issue preclusion is dated from the 
two Supreme Court decisions in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories u. 
University of Illinois Foundations and Parklane Hosiery Co. u. 
Shore.@ Blonder-Tongue marked the Supreme Court's abandon- 
ment of party mutuality as a prerequisite for defensive issue 
preclusion,1° and eight years later Parklane Hosiery approved 
offensive application of nonmutual preclusion.ll 
Review of the policies underlying issue .preclusion in prod- 
McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 195, 443 N.E.2d 978, 981 (1983): 
Case law in Ohio concerning the general doctrine of res judicata has long ago 
established the general principle that material facts or questions which were in 
issue in a former suit, and were there judicially determined by a court of compe- 
tent jurisdiction, are conclusively settled by a judgment therein so far as concerns 
the parties to that action and persons in privity with them. 
2 Ohio St. 3d at  195,443 N.E.2d a t  981; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 
27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid 
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determina- 
tion is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a 
different claim."). 
6. Issue preclusion absent complete commonality between the earlier suit's parties 
or their privies and the parties to the later suit is described as "nonmutual." See Park- 
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979). 
7. E.g., I n  re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1990): 
The doctrine of mutuality has been eroded, and a defendant may now preclude a 
nonparty to the previous suit from contesting an issue a plaintiff in the prior suit 
has already litigated and lost if the nonparty plaintiff has had a full and fair op- 
portunity to be heard on the issue. 
Id. a t  746 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Kortenhaus v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 228 N.J. Super. 162, 549 A.2d 437 (App. Div. 1988): 
[Clollateral estoppel is a rule of efficiency - a principle which seeks to promote 
efficient justice by avoiding the relitigation of matters which have been fully and 
fairly litigated and fully and fairly disposed of. Its preclusive effect will always be 
efficient in a narrow sense of judicial economy, but it will only be just when the 
criteria of full and fair determination of precisely the same issues have been met. 
Its application "necessarily rest[s] on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity." 
Id. a t  166, 549 A.2d at  439 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of 111. 
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971)). 
8. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
9. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
10. 402 U.S. at  327. 
11. 439 U.S. at  323; see infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text. 
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ucts liability suits, and the litigation experience therewith, in- 
vites these propositions: 
(1) Certain classes of products liability actions are more 
suited to issue preclusion than are others. For example, a design, 
warning, or'formulation claim, in which the claimant's conduct, 
knowledge or expertise is logically probative of the degree of 
risk, is less suited to application of issue preclusion .than is a 
claim in which such evidence is wholly irrelevant or only margin- 
ally relevant. 
(2) Granting issue preclusive effect to certain quasi-judicial 
proceedings often values judicial economy over fairness to the 
opponent. 
(3) Many decisions too readily find privity, and consequent 
issue preclusion, against parties whose relationship to an earlier 
claim is either derivative," or based upon limited contractual 
objectives,18 exalting judicial economy over the interest of fair- 
ness to the opponent.14 
11. Discussion 
A. Underlying Policy Considerations 
The "very basis of the rule"l%f issue preclusion has been 
described as "confidence in the first outcome."1e The doctrine's 
axial coordinates are judicial economy and fairness,17 against the 
backdrop of the due process clauses of the fifthlS and fourteenth 
12. For example, a spouse's claim in loss of consortium. 
13. For example, the reciprocal obligations set forth in a policy of liability insurance. 
14. For the purposes of this discussion, "proponent" means the party asserting that 
litigation of an issue should be precluded by a prior judgment, while "opponent" means 
the party against whom preclusion is asserted. 
15. Kortenhaus v. Eli Lilly & Co., 228 N.J. Super. 162, 168, 549 A.2d 437, 440 (App. 
Div. 1988). 
16. Id.; cf. 18 WRIGHT. MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 8 4416, 
at  142 (1981) ("The dangers of issue preclusion are as apparent as its virtues. The cen- 
tral danger lies in the simple but devastating fact that the first litigated determination of 
an issue may be wrong."). 
17. Referring to offensive use of collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court in Parklane 
Hosiery, described its "dual purpose" as that of "protecting litigants from the burden of 
relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial 
economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 
326 (1979). 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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amendments,19 and the seventh amendment.20 When the parties 
to the second litigation were also parties, or privies of the par- 
ties, to the first litigation, "mutuality" is said to exist.21 The pro- 
portionate and relational evaluation of judicial economy and 
fairness to the litigants should be seen schematically as three 
equivalent sectors within a single circle: 
Graph 1 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 2. 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. It  provides that: 
[Iln suits a t  common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol- 
lars, the right [of] trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall 
be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law. 
Id. 
21. See Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978 
(1983): 
There being the general requisite of an identity of persons and parties, or 
their privies, within the prior proceeding in order for the judgment or decree to 
operate as an estoppel, strangers to such a judgment or decree will not be affected 
thereby. For all practical purposes, the mutuality rule is coextensive with the re- 
quirement that the plea of res judicata is available only to a party to the judg- 
ment and to his privies. 
Id. at  196, 443 N.E.2d a t  982. 
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For application of issue preclusion where there is de jure pr 
de facto mutuality between the parties,22 the equivalent dimen- 
sions of the above sectors reflect the roughly coequal significance 
courts accord their respective considerati~n.~~ What about the 
application of issue preclusion on behalf of or against a party 
who has not had his "day in court" on the issue? When a party 
to the second action was a stranger to the first, one considers the 
three-sector analysis between the same parties or their privies, 
with one significant addition: a heightened solicitude for the op- 
ponent's earlier opportunity and incentive to litigate. In these 
circumstances, evaluation of the opponent's opportunity and in- 
centive to litigate transcends the interests of judicial economy 
and fairness to the pr~ponent.~'  This evaluation is schematically 
represented in Graph 2. 
Where there exists conventional p r i ~ i t y ~ ~  between and 
22. De jure mutuality exists where the later action involves the former's parties or 
privies of those parties. De facto mutuality exists in those limited circumstances where a 
current party, though neither party nor privy of a party in the earlier action, enjoyed a 
relationship of control or capacity to control the earlier action that justifies binding it by 
issues resolved in the earlier outcome. 
23. Where appropriate, issue preclusion serves the goal of judicial economy by pre- 
serving the integrity of any full and fair resolution of an issue in any future dispute 
between the initial parties or privies of those parties. Fairness to the proponent is mani- 
fest in not requiring him to relitigate an issue on which he has previously prevailed. 
Fairness to the party opposing preclusive effect of the prior judgment may be more accu- 
rately described absence of unfairness. Mutual issue preclusion works no unfairness on 
the opponent where, examining the identity of the claim and the context of the initial 
adjudication, the reasonable opposing party would be prompted to vigorously litigate the 
issue. Where mutuality exists, therefore, proper invocation of issue preclusion permits a 
party, or a party's privy, only one bite at  the apple. 
24. Generally, the opponent's marginal or nonexistent opportunity or incentive to 
litigate the issue in the prior litigation would lessen the effect of de novo litigation upon 
the policy of judicial economy because one or both parties to the subsequent action had 
not had an earlier actual or nominal day in court on the same issue. Similarly, the party- 
opponent's inadequate earlier opportunity. to litigate this issue against the current pro- 
ponent undercuts the proponent's argument that mustering prosecution or defense of the 
claim in the later action is an unfair burden. 
25. In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), the Supreme Court defined 
privity as including those 
for whose benefit and at  whose direction a cause of action is litigated. . . . [Olne 
who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of another to establish and protect 
his own right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action in aid of 
some interest of his own . . . is as much bound . . . as he would be if he had been a 
party to the record. 
Id. at  154 (quoting Souffront v. Campagnie des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475, 487 (1910)). 
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among parties to the prior litigation and the current one, the 
issue preclusion questions to be resolved by the court are rela- 
tively limited. First, is the issue before the tribunal identical to 
that litigated in the earlier action? Second, was that issue finally 
and necessarily decided in the earlier action? When the parties 
to the second action are not mutual, the court must evaluate 
three additional factors: current party de facto privity with an 
earlier litigant; full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in 
the prior proceeding; and comparable incentive to litigate.ae 
Fairness to Opponent . 
Graph 2 
In products liability claims, application of the issue identity, 
ruling finality, and ruling necessity criteria resemble those pur- 
26. Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-33 (1979) (relevant factors 
for determining whether plaintiff can invoke estoppel offensively include: whether plain- 
tiff could have effected joinder in the first action; whether application of estoppel would 
be inconsistent with previous decisions; and whether procedural opportunities available 
to defendant were unavailable in the first action); see infra notes 111-121 and accompa- 
nying text. 
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sued in other civil litigation, except for markings distinctive to 
products liability claims. In certain civil subject matters (for ex- 
ample, title to land, existence of a contract, patentable inven- 
tion) the facts are arguably immutable, if not the inferences to 
be derived therefrom." Therein resides the logic of reposing 
confidence in, or at least preclusive effect to, the resolution by 
the first court. 
In products liability actions, however, factual volatilitya8 
and doctrinal distinctionsa8 often militate against the fairness of 
giving preclusive effect to prior issue resolution. To select only 
the subject of adverse reactions to pharmaceuticals, use and user 
environment-specific questions should often preclude adoption 
of collateral estoppel. The question of whether "one individual 
might have an adverse reaction whereas another individual 
might not" differs qualitatively from the issues that might, for 
27. E.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 
(1971). The Court describes its "consistent view . . : that the holder of a patent should 
not be insulated from the assertion of defenses and thus allowed to exact royalties for 
the use of an idea that is not in fact patentable or that is beyond the scope of the patent 
monopoly granted," and concluded that nonmutual defensive issue preclusion should be 
available to a party "facing a charge of infringement of a patent that has once been 
declared invalid." Id. at  349-50. 
28. For example, Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 
N.E.2d 978 (1983), held that plaintiffs representing a four-year-old child injured when 
her foot slipped under a riding mower should not be permitted to assert nonmutual of- 
fensive collateral estoppel against the manufacturer, based upon an earlier judgment 
finding 1iability.for negligent design. The court found that 
there were two totally separate accidents, with two different models of a riding 
lawnmower manufactured in different years by appellant manufacturer; there 
were different operators of the equipment with perhaps totally different mechani- 
cal capabilities; different terrain and weather conditions. . . . [W]e hold that non- 
mutual collateral estoppel may not be used to preclude the relitigation of design 
issues relating to mass-produced products when the injuries arise out of distinct 
underlying incidents. 
Id. a t  204, 443 N.E.2d a t  988. 
29. For example, in a minority of jurisdictions, plaintiffs prima facie case in strict 
tort liability does not require a showing of an unreasonably dangerous condition of the 
product, and upon certain proof by plaintiff, effects a shifting of the burden of proof to 
defendant to show that the attributes of a particular design or formulation choice out- 
weigh the risks. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 
225 (1978). See generally Schwartz & Mahshigian, Offensive Collateral Estoppel: It Will 
Not Work in Product Liability, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 583, 588 n.29 (1986) ("Decisions 
on virtually every aspect of product liability law illustrate great variations among the 
States and constant changes of legal rules within a State." (quoting S. Rep. No. 670,97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982))). 
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example, be resolved in a negligence action arising from the 
same automobile accident.80 Consider as well these hypothetical 
cases: (1) the class action representative plaintiff seeking Rule 
23(b)s1 certification in a toxic tort action even after a court 
found with respect to an earlier class petition that plaintiffs' 
damage evidence was too varied to permit certification; (2) the 
defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer's effort to avoid preclu- 
sive effect of an earlier judgment that its product caused limb 
reduction in newborns, relying now upon newly discovered scien- 
tific evidence disproving causation; or (3) the successful workers' 
compensation claimant now suing the asbestos manufacturer 
and attempting to avoid the preclusive effect of an earlier ad- 
ministrative conclusion that the claimant could not identify the 
products of the individual asbestos  manufacturer^.^^ 
B. Elements of Issue Preclusion 
1. Generally 
Taken together, res judicata and issue preclusion ''prohibit 
relitigation of claims and issues decided in a prior pro~eeding."~~ 
Issue preclusion bars parties from relitigating an issue that was 
30. Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 211,218,377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 125 (1975) (quoting 
Williams v. Laurence-David, Inc., 534 P.2d 173, 178 n.1 (Ore. 1975) (en banc)). In Vin- 
cent, the court refused to grant issue preclusive effect to an earlier judgment that Parke- 
Davis' pharmaceutical Quadrigen was marketed with inadequate testing where plaintiff 
in the latter action offered only "conclusory" expert testimony "that the infant plaintiffs 
injuries were probably secondary to a DTP injection and that a bad vaccine would cause 
neurological shock . . . ." Id. a t  220, 377 N.Y.S.2d at  126. 
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
32. See Glow, Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Arizona: Fair Litigation us. Judicial 
Economy, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 535, 543 (1988). 
33. Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311, 315 (D.N.J. 1989). Parklane 
Hosiery distinguishes the two doctrines: 
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit 
bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same 
cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the 
second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior 
suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome 
of the first action. 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (citing 1B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FED- 
ERAL PRACTICE ll 0.405(1) a t  622-24 (2d ed. 1974)). See generally Note, Claim Preclrcsion 
in Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for Allowing Second Suits, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1989 n.1 & 1991-92 (1990). 
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necessarily litigated in an earlier action,s4 and poses the question 
of "whether a party has had his day in court on an issue, rather 
than whether he has had his day in court on that issue against a 
particular litigant."s6 Even a litigant's apparent prior "day in 
court" on an issue will not, however, automatically preclude re- 
litigation of an issue where the "practicalities" and "details" of 
the prior proceeding suggest that the party against whom pre- 
clusion is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the facturn probandurn before the second tribunal.s0 The 
vessel for the common law preference for finality in dispute reso- 
lution, issue preclusion may apply to evidentiary facts, ultimate 
facts, or law.s7 
34. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 29, at  583. 
35. Eason, 706 F. Supp. at  316 (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 191, 380 
A.2d 1128,1138 (1977)) (quoting McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 38 N.J. 156,161,183 A.2d 74, 
76 (1962)). See Sucher v. Kutscher's Country Club, 113 A.D.2d 928, 493 N.Y.S.2d 829 
(1985), for an example of an action initiated by a country club patron who fell from her 
wheelchair and was injured while using a chair lifting machine. In resolving the issue 
preclusion implications of subsequent third-party and fourth-party complaints by the 
country club and the vendor against the lift manufacturer, the court stated the general 
rule that 
[tlhe doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to preclude relitigation of an issue 
where it is found that (1) the issue sought to be precluded is identical to one 
which was necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, and (2) the litigant against 
whom preclusion is sought in the present proceeding had a full and fair opportu- 
nity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. 
Id. at  930, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 831. 
36. Zweig v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 222 N.J. Super. 306, 311-12, 536 A.2d 1280, 1282- 
83 (App. Div. 1988). 
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS $ 27 (1982); see, e.g., Hardy v. Johns- 
Manville Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 338 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) ("It is well established that collat- 
eral estoppel embraces matters both of fact and of law." (citing 1B J. MOORE. MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ll 0.442, at  3851 (2d ed. 1982))). Examples abound of related if not 
identical evidentiary treatment of sworn prior statements, judgments based thereon, or 
judicially-accepted facts. Party admissions, even where later withdrawn, will not operate 
to estop the party from taking an inconsistent position, although the prior admission is 
admissible both as impeachment and as evidence of the facts stated. E.g., Contractor 
Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1085 (7th Cir. 1981) (in 
action for breach of contract and fraud, it was error to exclude from evidence portions of 
plaintiffs original complaint, later amended); Raulie v. United States, 400 F.2d 487 (10th 
Cir. 1968): 
When a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded portion ceases to be a 
conclusive judicial admission; but it still remains as a statement once seriously 
made by an authorized agent, and as such it is competent evidence of the facts 
stated, though controvertible, like any other extrajudicial admission made by a 
party or his agent. 
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For a prior judgment to have issue preclusive effect, it is not 
necessary that i t  have been submitted to the fact finder. A 
court's resolution of an issue as a matter of law may constitute 
full and fair litigation of the issue. In Day v. Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesells~haft,~~ plaintiffs state court action against the au- 
tomobile manufacturer followed an adverse federal court ruling 
on the design and failure to warn claims pertaining to the ab- 
sence of shoulder h a r n e s s e ~ . ~ ~  Affirming the state trial court's 
summary judgment motion in favor of the manufacturer and im- 
porter, the Pennsylvania Superior Court commented: "[Ilt was 
not necessary in order to be 'litigated' that the issues have been 
determined by the jury."'O Even issues resolved by trial court 
consolidation of claims or elimination of claims considered re- 
dundant under state law may be considered fully litigated for 
the purposes of subsequent issue preclusion." 
An estoppel resulting from issues determined in a prior 
judgment is available to either a plaintiff or a defendant in a 
subsequent In most jurisdictions, the rule can be applied 
offensively to prohibit a defendant from relitigating issues de- 
cided in a prior case, even where the earlier action was brought 
400 F.2d a t  526 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Car- 
penter, 32 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1929)). 
A court of general jurisdiction may accord comparable treatment to prior party ad- 
missions even when the earlier statement was entered in a more limited forum, such as a 
workers' compensation proceeding. E.g., Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 306 Ill. 
App. 430, 438-41, 28 N.E.2d 743, 746-47 (1940) (manager's earlier statement that em- 
ployee had been injured on the job was held admissible in later wrongful death proceed- 
ing in which defendant employer claimed that decedent was acting as either an indepen- 
dent contractor or was on a frolic unrelated to employment). 
38. 464 A.2d 1313, 318 Pa. Super. 225 (1983). 
39. In Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 451 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Pa. 19771, 
aff'd, 578 F.2d 1373 (3d Cir. 1978), the court ruled that the absence of shoulder re- 
straints "was both obvious to the naked eye of anyone who made even a cursory inspec- 
tion of the vehicle, and was specifically referred to in the owner's manual." 451 F. Supp. 
at  6. The court also ruled as a matter of law that "the danger inherent in riding in the 
front seat of a rear-engine type vehicle [was] not a latent limitation requiring a warning 
of the risk involved." Id. 
40. 464 A.2d at 1319, 318 Pa. Super. a t  238; see supra note 33 and accompanying 
text. 
41. See Day, 464 A.2d at  1319 n.2, 318 Pa. Super. at 238 n.2 ("The cause of action 
for breach of warranty has also been 'litigated'. It  was eliminated prior to trial in favor of 
the cause based on absolute liability."). 
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS $ 27 (1982). 
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by a' different plaintiff.43 Defensive application of issue preclu- 
sion permits defendant to preclude even a new plaintiffs reliti- 
gation of previously decided issues.44 
The virtues of issue finality are both jurisprudentially and 
culturally grounded.46 Less abstractly, upon satisfaction of cer- 
tain conditions of issue commonality, necessity of determination 
and amenability to earlier litigation, courts and scholarly au- 
thorities are in agreement that issue preclusion is compatible 
with traditional notions of due proce~s.'~ 
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 27 states 
the general rule precluding parties from relitigating "an issue of 
fact or law" that was "actually litigated and determined" by 
"valid" and "final" judgment." Preclusive effect is only given 
43. Thus, issue preclusion might be properly applied on behalf of multiple claimants 
against a single defendant such as when many persons are killed in a single aviation 
accident. See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 55:9 (T. Travers, 3d 
ed. 1987) (citing Williams v. Laurence-David, Inc., 271 Or. 712, 534 P.2d 173 (1975)); 
Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 196, 443 N.E.2d 978, 982 n.7 
(1983) (the court, declining itself to adopt nonmutual issue preclusion, cited decisions in 
other jurisdictions where the requirement of mutuality has been dropped). 
44. E.g., Waggoner v. General Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1203 (Wyo. 1989) (prior 
jury verdict finding that nonparty driver's negligence was sole proximate cause of acci- 
dent collaterally estopped plaintiff from asserting warranty and strict liability claims 
against the automobile dealer and the manufacturer). 
45. Literature is suffused with affirmations of the desirability of symmetry between 
and predictability among decisions upon identical issues. E.g., S. JOHNSON. THE IDLER, 
no. 39 at  57 (1758) ("He is no wise man that will quit a certainty for an uncertainty."). 
46. See generally Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 
313, 328-29 (1971). 
47. "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and 
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is 
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different 
claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 27 (1982); accord, Producers Dairy De- 
livery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 cal. 3d 903, 718 P.2d 920, 226 cal. Rptr. 558 (1986): 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue previ- 
ously adjudicated iE (1) the issue necessarily decided in the previous suit is identi- 
cal to the issue sought to be relitigated; (2) there was a final judgment on the 
merits of the previous suit; and (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted 
was a party, or in privity with a party, to the previous suit. 
41 Cal.3d at 910, 718 P.2d at 923, 226 Cal. Rptr. at  561. 
Another conventional formulation of the elements necessary for finding issue preclu- 
sion is stated in these words: 
(1) [Wlhether the issue to be decided is identical with the issue decided in the 
prior litigation; (2) whether the prior litigation resulted in a judgment being de- 
cided on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom the assertion of collateral 
estoppel is being made was a party to the prior litigation; and (4) whether the 
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determinations "essential to the j~dgment."'~ In products liabil- 
ity actions the prerequisites are largely compatible, with most 
jurisdictions imposing four  prerequisite^:'^ (1) both actions must 
involve the identical issue;60 (2) the issue must actually have 
party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted had a full and fair oppor- 
tunity to litigate on the issues in the prior suit. 
Green v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 775 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Mo. 1989) (following Oates v. 
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 583 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1979)). 
The requirement that the issues have been "actually litigated" was affirmed in 
Hughes v. Santa Fe Corp., 847 F.2d 239, 240 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting International As- 
soc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Nix, 512 F.2d 125, 132 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 27 (1982); see also Eason v. Linden Avi- 
onics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311 (D.N.J. 1989): , 
Among the criteria to be considered before issue preclusion can be invoked 
are whether: (i) the party to be estopped was a party or in privity with a party in 
the prior action; (ii) the issue to be estopped is the same as that previously liti- 
gated; and (iii) the issue was actually litigated (or finally resolved) and necessary 
to the prior judgment. 
706 F. Supp. a t  316. 
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments states that "[s]ubsequent action between 
the parties" preserves the common law predisposition to confine issue preclusion to sub- 
sequent actions between the parties or their privies. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDC- 
MENTS 5 27 (1982). 
49. Decisions differ on the issue of whether state law or federal common law applies 
to the preclusive effect of a prior diversity judgment. Courts concluding that federal pre- 
clusion law applies note that "the rules of claim and issue preclusion define the finality 
of the federal judgment and are designed to protect that judgment." Johnson v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 689 F. Supp. 170, 172 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); see, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982): 
The choice of law question is supposedly of significance because, according to ap- 
pellants, Texas strictly adheres to the doctrine of mutuality, i.e., neither party can 
use a prior judgment to estop another unless both parties were bound by the prior 
judgment. If this view of Texas law is correct, the plaintiffs here, none of whom 
were parties to [Borel v. ~ibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 
19731, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974)l would of course be unable to invoke col- 
lateral estoppel. 
We need not resolve the question of whether appellant's view of Texas law of 
collateral estoppel is correct, however, since the district court was bound under 
the law of our circuit to apply federal law. . . . [Flederal res judicata principles 
apply in federal tort claim actions in order to preserve the integrity of federal 
court judgments, and that this rationale applies equally to diversity cases. 
Id. at  337 (citations omitted). 
Other courts consider preclusion law to be substantive, requiring application of state 
preclusion law in diversity actions. E.g., Costanini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 
1199, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982); Gasbarra v. Park-Ohio Indus., 
655 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1981). 
50. Thus, for example, the issues raised by an asbestos worker's claims against an 
asbestos manufacturer, where the defendant manufacturer prevailed for want of proof 
that the worker suffered from asbestosis, were held not identical to (and therefore did 
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been litigated in the prior action; (3) the determination of the 
issue in the first action must have been a necessary part of the 
judgment therein; and (4) the party against whom preclusion is 
asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.61 
An absolute due process prerequisite to the application of collat- 
eral estoppel is that the party asserting preclusion must estab- 
lish that the identical issue was (1) actually litigated; (2) di- 
rectly determined; and (3) essential to the judgment in a prior 
action."' 
Where it is foreseeable that the issue could subsequently be 
utilized collaterally, and where the parties to the first action 
have had the incentive to litigate the action "fully and vigor- 
o ~ s l y , " ~ ~  issue preclusive effect may be given the judgment of 
any tribunal having subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, 
including an administrative tribunal."' Evaluation of a party's 
earlier prior opportunity and incentive to litigate looks beyond 
the presence or absence of formal or nominal opportunity, and is 
agreed generally to require examination of the particular litiga- 
tion context in which the earlier action was tried or judgment 
entered. Review may be had of such factors as (1) the size of the 
claim; (2) extent of the litigation; (3) availability of any new evi- 
dence; (4) differences in applicable law; and (5) existence of 
prior inconsistent verdictsSs6 
not preclude) the claimant's later action against his employer claiming that his employer, 
Celotex, with knowledge exposed him to hazardous asbestos products and failed to cor- 
rect the hazardous conditions. Walker v. GAF Corp., No. 88-3380 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 
1989) (LEXIS, GenFed library, USAPP). 
51. See supra note 39. 
52. A further and implicit requirement is that the authority upon which the earlier 
judgment is grounded should remain viable .doctrine in the jurisdiction of the later ac- 
tion. Cf. Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 891 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1989) (issue 
preclusive effect inappropriate where prior judgment upon which lower court relied in 
barring relitigation of issue was reversed by an appellate court five days prior to lower 
court judgment). 
53. See 4 AMERICAN LAW PRODUCTS LIABILITY 8 5512, at  16 (T. Travers, 3d ed. 
1987). 
54. Cf. Smith v. Pinner, 891 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1989) (employee's stipulation in 
earlier workmen's compensation case that employee was ridesharing with supervisor a t  
the time of the accident precluded relitigation of supervisor's "scope of employment" in 
subsequent vicarious liability action against employer). 
For a criticism of granting issue preclusive effect to certain administrative determi- 
nations, see supra notes 201-218 and accompanying text. 
55. Regarding the existence of prior inconsistent verdicts, it is held uniformly that 
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2. Issue Identity 
Whether the claimed issue preclusion involves the same par- 
ties or their privies, or one or more new parties, the proponent 
must demonstrate the substantial identity of the present issue 
with the issue already decided.6B The court's analysis of what 
issues were necessarily decided may reference not only the spe- 
cific findings entered, including any pertinent jury interrogato- 
ries, but also plaintiffs own expressions of issues.67 
Many obstacles are placed in the path of a proponent's 
proof of issue identity. A paradigm of the proponent's challenge 
can be found in the litigation following Borel u. Fibreboard Pa- 
per Products C ~ r p . ~ ~  In Borel, the plaintiff, an industrial worker 
who contracted asbestosis and mesothelioma, brought suit 
against a number of insulation manufacturers, alleging that the 
defendants were strictly liable for failing to warn about the dan- 
gers of long-term exposure to asbestos. Based on the evidence 
presented, the jury found the manufacturers were liable because 
divergent decisions reached in earlier actions militate strongly against granting issue 
preclusive effect to the prior decision advanced by the issue preclusion proponent. E.g., 
Deviner v. Electrolux Motor, 844 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1988): 
In [Nettles v. Electrolux Motor AB, 784 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986)], the jury 
decided the question under the Extended Liability Doctrine in favor of the plain- 
tiff Nettles. But in the case at  bar the jury to whom that issue was submitted 
decided in favor of defendants. I t  would be an unusually ingenious quirk in our 
system of justice, which attaches special sanctity to jury verdicts, if it permitted 
appellant to circumvent the unfavorable jury verdict against him by applying via a 
doctrine of estoppel the verdict of a different jury in a different case. 
Id. at  774. 
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS i 29 comment a (1982): 
Issues affected. The rule of this section applies only to preclude relitigation of 
issues that the party would have been precluded from relitigating with his original 
adversary. Accordingly, preclusion may be imposed only if, as stated in 8 27, the 
issue was the same as that involved in the present action and was actually liti- 
gated and essential to a prior judgment that is valid and final. 
Id. 
57. E.g., Hurley v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 355 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 
U.S. 821 (1966). In Hurley, the court affirmed a judgment for the defendant on plaintiffs 
negligence count (Count II), and found that issues necessarily resolved by the negligence 
count precluded plaintiffs relitigation of its implied warranty of merchantability counts 
(Count I). The court reasoned that, "there was an identity of factual allegations between 
counts I and 11. The only substantive difference between the counts lay in their respec- 
tive theories of action. . . . Proof of the same defect was essential to recovery under 
either theory of the complaint." Id. 
58. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). 
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they failed to warn about the foreseeable dangers associated 
with exposure to asbestos. Ten years later, different plaintiffs 
brought an action in which they sought to utilize Borel to pre- 
clude the litigation of the issue of causation. In Hardy u. Johns- 
Manville Sales C ~ r p . , ~ ~  the trial court held that Borel estab- 
lished as a matter of law that asbestos is a substance that can 
produce asbestosis and mesothelioma, and that no warnings 
were issued by any of the asbestos insulators prior to 1964. As a 
consequence, the trial court held, "the plaintiff need not prove 
that defendants either knew or should have known of the dan- 
gerous propensities of their products and therefore should have 
warned consumers of these dangers, defendants being precluded 
from showing otherwi~e."~~ The Fifth Circuit reversed, conclud- 
ing that Borel did not necessarily decide the state of manufac- 
turer knowledge as to the dangers of asbestos exposure.81 Specif- 
ically, Borel did not resolve as a matter of fact that "all 
manufacturers of asbestos-containing insulation products had a 
duty to warn as of 1936, and all failed to warn adequately after 
196'4."8a A proponent's failure to demonstrate issue commonality 
was also evidenced in Walker v. GAF C ~ r p . , ~ ~  where claimant's 
intentional tort action against an employer followed an adverse 
determination in plaintiffs negligence and strict products liabil- 
ity claims.84 
59. 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). 
60. Id. a t  336-37. 
61. Id. at  345. 
62. Id. The court further explained that: "[O]ur opinion in Borel merely approved 
of the various ways the jury could have come to a conclusion concerning strict liability 
for failure to warn. We did not say that any of the specific alternatives that the jury had 
before it were necessary or essential to its verdict." Id. 
63. No. 88-3380 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 1989) (LEXIS, GenFed library, USAPP). 
64. Id. a t  4. The Walker court stated: 
We believe the district court improperly granted summary judgment on the 
basis of collateral estoppel because Walker's bald claim that Celotex, his former 
employer, committed an intentional tort does not necessarily raise the precise is- 
sue of whether or not Walker suffers from asbestosis, which was the issue raised 
and actually-litigated in the prior proceeding . . . . 
Id. 
For an example highlighting the effect of the context of the earlier litigation upon 
the court's assessment of the opponent's earlier opportunity and incentive to litigate, see 
McCarthy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335 (D. Mass. 1980) (offensive 
issue preclusion was not applied against defendant manufacturers of asbestos products 
because they could not have foreseen the advent of mass asbestos litigation a t  the time 
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The opponent's argument that new evidence militates 
against the estoppel effect of a prior judgment has been inter- 
preted to include new evidence in light of increased scientific or 
-medical knowledge of epidemiology or causation. For example, 
in Zweig v.  E.R. Squibb & S o n ~ , ~ V h e  defendant, a manufacturer 
of the anti-miscarriage drug Delalutin, avoided the issue preclu- 
sive effect of an adverse prior jury verdict by showing that more 
recent scientific inquiry and FDA examination "cast doubt" 
upon prior findings of fact implicating the drug in newborn limb 
red~ction.~" 
In products liability, special issue preclusion questions are 
raised by the practice of pleading multiple tort and warranty 
claims arising from the same facts. For example, in products lia- 
bility actions alleging the seller's negligence, breach of warranty, 
and strict tort liability, aspects of plaintiffs proof on the negli- 
gence count are virtually indistinguishable from what plaintiff 
must prove in her strict liability count. Thus plaintiffs proof of 
defect in negligence imports proof that the product was sold in 
an unsafe and unreasonably dangerous c o n d i t i ~ n . ~ ~  In most 
the prior case was tried); see also Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289 (6th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984). 
Where arguable distinctions exist between the issue previously litigated and the one 
for which a party seeks preclusion, one factor to be evaluated is whether there exists "a 
substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be advanced in the second pro- 
ceeding and that advanced in the first." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS $ 27 com- 
ment c (1982). 
65. 222 N.J. Super. 306, 536 A.2d 1280 (App. Div. 1988). 
66. Id. at  312, 536 A.2d a t  1283. The Zweig court noted: 
The record discloses that studies of Delalutin, conducted after the Utah verdict, 
have absolved the drug of the harmful effects alleged here. There is now biological 
evidence that the drug cannot cause limb reduction. The FDA, which in 1977 had 
warned against using Delalutin during the first trimester of pregnancy, is now con- 
sidering whether to retract that warning in light of a recommendation from its 
Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs Advisory Committee that Delalutin does not 
appear to be harmful. Later scientific discoveries that cast doubt on prior findings 
of scientific facts deprive those earlier findings of collateral estoppel effect. 
Id. 
67. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 395 (1965): 
[negligence liability for a] manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in 
the manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as 
involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to those who use it for a 
purpose for which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those 
whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to them by i t .  lawful use in a manner and for a purpose 
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states, proof of defect in strict tort liability requires that the 
plaintiff prove that the product was sold in a defective and un- 
reasonably dangerous ~ondition.'~ In an implied warranty of 
merchantability claim, plaintiff must prove that the product was 
nonmerchantable as sold, without the necessity of showing that 
the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous.'@ 
The question of whether judgment adverse to plaintiff in a 
negligence claim against a manufacturer suffices to estop plain- 
tiffs later claim for breach of the implied warranty. of 
merchantability was before the court in Hurley. v. Beech Air- 
craft Corp.'O There a personal representative's wrongful death 
action alleged the defective condition of the aircraft's left wing. 
The plaintiffs original implied warranty claim was dismissed for 
lack of privity, and judgment was entered for defendant on the 
negligence count. On appeal, plaintiffs warranty claim,was rein- 
stated, the court and the parties agreeing that in Indiana no 
privity needs be shown for a claim in implied warranty.?' Never- 
theless, the court affirmed defendant's judgment on both claims, 
concluding that the adverse judgment in negligence precluded 
plaintiffs claim in implied warranty. The court reasoned that 
the prior findings of no defect on the negligence claim were 
equally dispositive of plaintiffs required showing of defect for 
breach of the implied warranty of mer~hantability.?~ 
for which it is supplied. 
Id. 
68. See id. at  § 402A. 
69. E.g., U.C.C. fj 2-314 (1978). See generally Note, Strict Liability and Warranty in 
Consumer Protection: The Broader Protection of the UCC In  Cases Involving Economic 
Loss, Used Goods, and Nondangerous Defective Goods, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 
(1982). 
70. 355 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 821 (1966). 
71. 355 F.2d a t  519. 
72. Id. at  520. The court stated: 
Proof of the same defect was essential to recovery under either theory of the 
complaint. 
. . . .  
Plaintiffs position is that in trial on the breach of warranty, they would have 
only to show that there was an in-flight structural failure of a brand new aircraft, 
that failure being identified as the separation of the wing while the plane was 
apparently in routine normal flight. This position fails to take into account the 
findings of fact of the trial court in the negligence action . . . which attribute the 
structural failure to excessive forces upon the plane and which state that the sepa- 
ration did not occur during the normal flight of the aircraft, but after it had de- 
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Ordinarily, however, a court will not grant preclusive effect 
to a prior issue determination upon proponent's simple showing 
that the issue resolved. was within the constellation of claims 
raised in a multi-count action. For example, it has been held 
that the voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a contractor's neg- 
ligence claim against the architect for a municipal project did 
not purport to resolve issues raised in the contractor's subse- 
quent claim in breach of contract against the muni~ipali ty.~~ 
Nonetheless, there is agreement that a party's failure, as a mat- 
ter of fact or as a matter of law, to prevail on an issue common 
to more than one of its claims will operate to estop relitigation 
of the same issue in a subsequent suit, even when the issue per- 
tains to a different claim.74 
3. Necessity and Clarity of Valid and Final Order 
Pendency of the losing party's appeal of a judgment does 
not alter its finality for issue preclusion  purpose^.'^ Congruently, 
a subsequent determination that an action was brought and re- 
solved in the wrong forum will not strip the earlier action of 
preclusive effect.76 
To be accorded preclusive effect, a judgment must have nec- 
essarily decided the issue. Accordingly, a reviewing court's later 
scended to 7,000 feet from 11,000 feet in considerably less than a minute. Thus, 
the fact upon which plaintiffs are compelled to base their entire breach of war- 
ranty action, i.e., a defect in the aircraft, is a fact with respect to which the trial 
court has already made an adverse finding. 
Id. at 520-21. 
73. Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 573, 716 P.2d 28, 31 (1986). 
The court noted: "From a review of the record, we believe that [contractor] Chaney was 
entitled to produce evidence and did produce evidence which showed that the delays .in 
its performance could have been caused by the [city's] plans and not by Chaney without 
[architect] Kulseth necessarily being negligent as a result." Id .  
74. See, e.g., supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
75. E.g., Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986) (a judgment is 
final for purposes of issue preclusion even where an appeal is taken, except in circurn- 
stances where the "appeal" actually constitutes a trial de novo); cf. Waggoner v. General 
Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1204 (Wyo. 1989) (footnote omitted): 
Here, the fact question of proximate cause, or more precisely "cause in fact," was 
determined against appellant in the trial of hi negligence claim. Although . . . 
appellant has appealed the negligence determination, we herein have affirmed the 
district court on that claim and that judgment is now just as conclusive as if it had 
not been appealed. 
76. Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 753 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). 
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observation that evidence raised a submissible jury question on 
a particular matter does not mean that the particular issue was 
so decided, absent. evidence in the judgment or order itself.77 
Issue preclusive effect will not be given where the prior or- 
der is not clear.78 A court's simple statement granting defend- 
ants' motions to dismiss grounded variably on lack of in per- 
sonam jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and improper venue 
has been held not to preclude litigation of the in personam issue 
against one prevailing defendant where "[sleveral interpreta- 
tions car? be given" to the prior order.?@ 
C. Application to Specific Issues, Proceedings, and Procedural 
Stages 
1. Jurisdiction 
Prior determination of in personam'jurisdiction is generally 
found to preclude litigation of jurisdictional questions in a later 
77. For example, in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 
19821, the court clarified that the import of the Borel decision was only that 
the jury could have grounded strict liability on the absence of a warning prior to 
1964 or "could have concluded that [post-1964 and post-19661 'cautions' were not 
warnings in the sense that they adequately communicated to Borel and other in- 
sulation workers knowledge of the dangers to which they were exposed. . . . We 
did not say that any of the specific alternatives that the jury had before it were 
necessary or essential to its verdict." 
Id. at  345 (quoting Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1104 (5th Cir. 
19731, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974)). Thus, the court concluded: 
[slince we cannot say that Borel necessarily decided, as a matter of fact, that all 
lhanufacturen of asbestos-containing insulation products knew or should have 
known of the dangers of their particular products a t  all relevant times, we cannot 
justify the trial court's collaterally estopping the defendants from presenting evi- 
dence as to the state of the art. 
Id. 
78. Green v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 775 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
79. Id. at  165. The court hearing the issue preclusion question stated: 
The judge's order is not clear. Several interpretations can be given to the . 
words "Defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack 
of venue sustained." Under the facts presented here it is impossible to determine 
what the court was making reference to in its order. Magna's interpretation, that 
the dismissal on the grounds of jurisdiction applied only to Magna is misleading 
and ignores Montgomery Ward's assertion as to jurisdiction and the lack thereof 
in its initial "Motion to Dismiss" and its later "Motion to Dismiss or Transfer" 
which specifically states, "This court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter." 
Accordingly, collateral estoppel presents no bar in the instant case. 
Id. 
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suit only where the issue of jurisdiction was resolved unambigu- 
ously in the prior action and the nonprevailing party on that 
issue had a full opportunity to litigate the issue.80 In Green v. 
Montgomery Ward & CO.,~' the court found that a prior judg- 
ment dismissing a retailer's indemnification action against a saw 
manufacturer did not collaterally estop subsequent judicial eval- 
uation of whether there existed in personam jurisdiction over 
the manufacturer. The appeal in that action originated in a per- 
sonal injury suit brought against Montgomery Ward, the re- 
tailer, and Magna American Corp., the manufacturer and de- 
signer of the Shopsmith V Multipurpose Wood Saw. In the first 
action, the trial court granted Montgomery Ward's motion to 
dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of 
venue, and Magna's motion to dismiss grounded on lack of per- 
sonal jurisdiction and lack of venue.8a In a subsequent action 
filed by the injured plaintiff against Montgomery Ward alone, 
Montgomery Ward filed a third-party petition against Magna. 
The trial court dismissed the third-party action on the basis of 
the certified copy of the prior order.8s 
On appeal, the court referenced the conventional criteria for 
issue preclusion, adding that " [clollateral estoppel only pertains 
to those issues which were 'necessarily and unambiguously de- 
~ided.'"~' The court concluded that the prior dismissal of 
Magna for want of in personam jurisdiction did not preclude the 
retailer's current claim that jurisdiction existed in the second ac- 
tion, reasoning that "Montgomery Ward was not accorded a 'full 
and fair' opportunity to litigate, nor was the issue resolved in an 
unambiguous fashion by the St. Louis court and no judgment 
was rendered on the merits of the case."86 To Magna's argument 
that the retailer had such an opportunity as it was "allied" with 
Mr. Green in the original action and "should have contemplated 
a third-party action or cross claim a t  a later date," the court 
80. See, e.g., Bascom v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 395 N.W.2d 879, 885 (Iowa 
1986) (dismissal for lack of in personam jurisdiction of earlier employee negligence action 
against employer warranted dismissal of second action on the basis of issue preclusion). 
81. 775 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
82. Id. at 163. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 164 (citing Burton v. State, 726 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)). 
85. Id.  at 164-65. 
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demurred, commenting: "In theinitial action both Montgomery 
and Magna sought to dismiss Green's petition. Montgomery 
Ward had no reason to oppose Magna's motion to dismiss. 
Montgomery Ward's position was one of co-defendant and no 
logical reading of the facts shows it to be allied with Green."8B 
Lack of finality in a prior jurisdictional judgment sufficed 
for the court in Eason u. Linden Avionics, to deny issue 
preclusive effect. There, Beech Aircraft Corporation had been a 
defendant in a prior state court action arising from the same 
occurrence, where, the court summarized, having "an equally 
strong incentive to avoid the jurisdiction of the state and federal 
courts," the manufacturers "had asserted the identical personal 
jurisdiction defense."es Beech argued against granting issue 
preclusive effect to the state court's interlocutory rejection of its 
jurisdictional claims on the grounds that under New Jersey law 
such an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss was not 
"final" for issue preclusion p ~ r p o s e s . ~ ~  Conceding that the state 
trial court's denial of Beech's motion was not "tentative," the 
federal district court nonetheless observed that as "[a] prior 
state court ruling on the issue of personal jurisdiction may be 
upset long after entry of judgment in federal court . . . . 
[Plreclusion of a provisionally resolved issue would not be 
appr~pr ia te . "~~  
2. Quasi-Judicial Determinations 
It  is generally accepted that when an administrative body 
acts in a judicial or a quasi-judicial capacity, "the decision and 
findings are entitled to finality under the doctrines of res judi- 
cata or collateral e ~ t o p p e l . " ~ ~  Arising commonly in the context of 
workers' compensation proceedings and negligence or products 
liability suits deriving from the same accident, it has been stated 
86. Id. The court added: "It would have been unusual for Montgomery Ward to 
challenge Magna's status at this point as they too sought dismissal." Id. 
87. 706 F. Supp. 311 (D.N.J. 1989). 
88. Id. at 316. 
89. Id. at 317. 
90. Id. at 318 (citation omitted). 
91. Brown v. Dow Chemical Co., 875 F.2d 197, 199 (8th Cir. 1989) (Arkansas Work- 
ers' Compensation Commission's finding that plaintiff failed to establish causation col- 
laterally estopped his later products liability action). 
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that "[c]ollateral estoppel operates between judicial and board 
determinations. . . . [Tlhe relationship of court to agency [is] 'a 
statutory-decisional system in which both trial court and 'work- 
men's compensation agency are bound to accept the other's prior 
adjudication . . . . 9 ,,ea 
3. Class Action Certification 
In re A.H. Robbins CO.@~ raised, among other matters, the 
issue preclusive effect of a prior trial court's denial of a products 
liability claimant's application for class action certification. In 
that action, brought by plaintiff against the product manufac- 
turer's insurance carrier as joint tortfeasor, the federal appellate 
court held .that plaintiffs application for class action certifica- 
tion in its negligence and warranty claims for punitive damages 
were barred by virtue of an earlier California federal court re- 
fusal to certify such a class on the grounds that plaintiffs class 
failed to show the commonality, typicality, and adequate repre- 
sentation requisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).@' 
4. Vicarious Liability 
Where a claimant fails to establish liability against an em- 
ployee tortfeasor, a later vicarious liability action against the 
employer will be p r e c l ~ d e d . ~ ~  In other professional relationships, 
however, judgment for or against one actor will not necessarily 
92. Anderson-Cottonwood Disposal Serv. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 
135 Cal. App. 3d 326, 332, 185 Cal. Rptr. 336, 339-40 (1982) (citations omitted). For a 
criticism of granting issue preclusive effect to certain aspects of workers' compensation 
proceedings, see infra notes 201-218 and accompanying text. 
93. 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). 
94. Id. 
95. E.g., Staples v. Hoeflce, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1397, 235 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1987): 
The pertinent law is as follows: ". . . in actions of tort, if the defendant's responsi- 
bility is necessarily dependent upon the culpability of another who was the imme- 
diate actor, and who, in an action against him by the same plaintiff for the same 
act, has been judged not culpable, the defendant may have the benefit of that 
judgment as an estoppel . . . ." 
Id. a t  1415, 235 Cal. Rptr. a t  177. (quoting Charles H. Duell, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn- 
Mayer Corp., 128 Cal. App. 376, 383, 17 P.2d 781, 784 (1932)); see also Vezina v. Conti- 
nental Casualty Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 665, 672, 136 Cal. Rptr. 198, 202 (1977) (plaintiffs 
action against insurance company for injuries sustained in accident with vehicle operated 
by carrier's employee barred by finding in earlier personal injury action that employee 
was not acting within the scope of his employment a t  the time of the accident). 
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give rise to an estoppel effect on issues in a later action. For 
example, in Chaney Building Co. v. City of T ~ c s o n , ~ ~  the Ari- 
zona Supreme Court considered a municipality's claim that a 
dismissal with prejudice in a contractor's earlier claim against 
the architect precluded the contractor's subsequent claim 
against the city for breach of contract. The court stated: "In the 
current action Tucson was sued for wrongful termination and 
breach of contract; [the architect] Kulseth for negligence. We do 
not believe that this was a case where Tucson's liability was sim- 
ply derivative from any liability of K~lseth."@~ 
5. Discovery 
A prior judgment on a discovery matter will be denied issue 
preclusive effect where either, the discovery rules governing the 
earlier and later discovery contests vary or the nature or scope 
of the later application for discovery differs from the one earlier 
decided. For example, in Application of American Tobacco 
CO.,@~ the court heard the appeal of a contempt order against 
nonparty researchers for their failure to comply with subpoenas 
which requested research data on the hazards of smoking. At is- 
sue was a second subpoena issued by the defendants, the first 
subpoena having been held to pose "an unreasonable burden 
upon the medical and scientific institutions involved . . . ."@@ The 
second subpoena sought fewer items than the first, "concentrat- 
ing primarily on the computer tapes storing the relevant raw 
data."loO The trial court rejected the nonparty's motion to 
quash, based in part upon its interpretation of the issues deter- 
mined by the court quashing the original subpoena, reasoning 
further that New York discovery rules differed from their fed- 
eral  counterpart^.'^' Observing that principles of issue preclu- 
sion "have been applied in federal court to bar an attack on a 
subpoena," the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that 
"[wlhere . . . the first subpoena has been quashed as overly 
96. 148 Ariz. 571, 716 P.2d 28 (1986). 
97. Id. at 574, 716 P.2d at 31. 
98. 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1989). 
99. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 2d 282, 287-88, 518 N.Y.S.2d 729, 
734 (Sup. Ct.  1987). 
100. See American Tobacco, 880 F.2d at 1525. 
101. Id. 
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broad and a second subpoena is served which is clearly narrower 
or more specific, New York law does not give preclusive effect to 
the decision quashing the earlier subpoena."10a 
6. Arbitration 
In some jurisdictions there exist, by statute, required arbi- 
tral processes to which claimants injured in vehicular accidents 
must first resort.10s As a general rule, arbitral awards pursuant 
to a statutory program of arbitration for automobile negligence, 
even where accepted by the claimant, will have no issue preclu- 
sive effect on later claims between and among the same par- 
ties.lo4 Where, on the other hand, an arbitration forum provides 
a party with an adversarial forum that is qualitatively, if not for- 
mally, similar to that of a court of general jurisdiction, there is 
authority approving dismissal of a party's later endeavor to reli- 
tigate issues decided by the arbitrator.lo5 
7. Consent Judgments, Stipulations, and Settlements 
Prior judgments entered by consent are not ordinarily given 
issue preclusive effect in a subsequent suit, on the logic that the 
issues underlying the prior judgment were neither actually liti- 
gated nor necessary and essential to the judgment. Like treat- 
102. Id. a t  1527. The court explained: 
[Tlhe subpoenas a t  issue in the present case are plainly narrower than the sub- 
poena's quashed [earlier]. For example, whereas the Page subpoenas requested the 
raw data in its original form (e.g., interview notes, completed questionnaires, x- 
rays), the present subpoenas seek only the computer tapes plus such information 
as is necessary to interpret those tapes. Further, the present subpoenas, unlike the 
Page subpoenas, do not seek information that pertains to events occurring subse- 
quent to the periods covered by the published articles. 
Since the two sets'of subpoenas are significantly different, the district court 
properly rejected the contention that enforcement of the present subpoenas was 
precluded by the decision in [the earlier case] quashing the broader subpoenas. 
Id.  
103. E.g., Taha v. DePalma, 214 N.J. Super. 397, 400-01, 519 A.2d 905, 906-07 
(1986) (nonbinding, albeit mandatory arbitration proceedings for claims of vehicular neg- 
ligence not intended to be final adjudications). 
104. Id. a t  400-01, 519 A.2d at 906-07. 
105. E.g., Bailey v. Metropolitan Property and Liab. Ins. Co., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 
36-37, 505 N.E.2d 908, 911-12 (1987) (plaintiff, a passenger injured in a vehicular acci- 
dent, proceeded to arbitration against one of the driver's carriers and was awarded 
damages). 
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ment is usually accorded settlements.loe However, in some cir- 
cumstances, an action settled during the pendency of an appeal 
may still be vested with preclusive effect.lo7 
Stipulations dismissing actions may, however, preclude liti- 
gation of issues resolved therein where the language of the dis- 
missal "indicate[s] the parties agreed that [an issue] should be 
deemed conclusively established . . . . ,9108 
The compensatory component of a settlement is, of course, 
issue preclusive. Defendants settling claims against injured per- 
sons may be protected from subsequent third-party claims 
lodged by defendants in a later action where the settlements 
were entered in good faith.loe A court's recognition of issue 
preclusive effect in a prior settlement will not be vitiated by a 
later determination that the dismissing court was the wrong fo- 
rum in which to bring the action.l1° 
D. Nonmutual Issue Preclusion 
1.  Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate 
Federal law has rejected the requirement of mutuality, i.e., 
the rule that neither party can enlist a prior judgment to pre- 
106. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1986). 
107. E.g., Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal. 3d 903, 907, 718 
P.2d 920, 924, 226 Cal. Rptr. 558, 562 (1986) (the settlement occurring after affirmance 
on appeal, although prior to expiration of the time for appeals to the state's highest 
court, provided even greater indicia that the judgment was "the.last word" of the render- 
ing court (citing Sandoval v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 932,936,190 Cal. Rptr. 29, 
31 (1983))). 
108. Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 573, 716 P.2d 28, 30 (1986). 
The court held that the absence of such indication in the dismissal obviated the city's 
reliance upon dismissal to preclude issues in contractor's suit against the city for breach 
of contract. Id .  a t  573, 716 P.2d at  30. 
109. Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 753 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Mo. 1988). 
110. Id.  at  894. 
The railroad argues that the trial court was in error in concluding that the 
settlements had been reached in good faith. The Illinois appellate court expressly 
rejected this contention. It could not be predicted, at  the time the settlements 
were entered into, that the courts of the forum state would ultimately conclude 
that the case should have been brought someplace else. The settling defendants 
were confronted with a very substantial trial, and each of them paid a seven figure 
amount to dispose of the claim against it. The policy underlying the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel calls for its application here, as to an issue expressly presented 
to and decided by the Illinois courts. 
Id.  at  893. 
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clude litigation of an issue unless both parties were bound by 
that ruling.ll1 While state law provides variable guidance, most 
states have abandoned the mutuality requirement.lla Authors of 
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments reached a conforming 
conclusion. The current Restatement eliminates the requirement 
of mutuality, adopting instead "a more flexible rule . . . which 
emphasize[s] a discretionary weighing of economy against fair- 
ness."llS Additionally, section 29 states that a party precluded 
from relitigating an issue with an opposing party pursuant to 
sections 27 and 28 is likewise precluded from doing so with a 
stranger to the earlier litigation "unless the fact that he lacked 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or 
other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to reli- 
tigate the issue."l14 
When issue preclusion is asserted by a person not a party to 
the initial litigation, the decisions and the Restatement both 
111. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Blonder-Tongue 
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 332 (1971). 
112. See Kortenhaus v. Eli Lilly & Co., 228 N.J. Super. 162, 165, 549 A.2d 437, 438 
(App. Div. 1988); East Tex. Motor Freight Lines v. Freeman, 289 Ark. 539, 713 S.W.2d 
456 (1986): 
[Clollateral estoppel requires four elements before a determination is conclusive in 
a subsequent proceeding: 1) the, issue sought to be precluded must be the same as 
that involved in the prior litigation; 2) that issue must have been actually liti- 
gated; 3) it must have been determined by a valid and final judgment; and 4) the 
determination must have been essential to the judgment. 
289 Ark. a t  543, 713 S.W.2d a t  459; cf. Kearney v. Kansas Pub. Serv. Co., 233 Kan. 492, 
512, 665 P.2d 757, 774 (1983). In the earlier action, 
all defendant. fully litigated the issues of their respective liability and that case 
has now been finally determined. Under the facts of these cases where there were 
no claims by any defendants in any of the cases that any of the plaintiffs were 
negligent or at fault and the only issues thereon were among the three codefend- 
ants, there existed mutuality and identity of the parties sufficient to invoke col- 
lateral estoppel in the later cases. We are not called upon and do not here decide 
whether mutuality of estoppel is still a valid requirement for the application of 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel in other cases. 
233 Kan. at  512-13, 665 P.2d a t  774-75 (original emphasis). 
113. See Kortenhaus, 228 N.J. Super. at  165, 549 A.2d a t  438. 
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP JUDGMENTS 3 29 (1982); see, e.g., Sucher v. Kut- 
scher's Country Club, 113 A.D.2d 928, 930, 493 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832 (1985) (following the 
conclusion that the issue sought to be decided in the subsequent litigation is the same, 
and that it was "necessarily determined" in the earlier action, the court stated that 
"[tlhe second part [of a collateral estoppel analysis] is an inquiry as to whether the party 
sought to be precluded had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the prior 
proceeding."). 
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grant correspondingly greater weight to the party opponent's 
"fairness" arguments against granting estoppel effect.l16 Section 
29 of the Restatement describes one general and several particu- 
lar circumstances to be evaluated in addition to those enumer- 
ated in section 28.lZ8 One federal court summarized the "fair- 
ness" evaluation by posing these questions: 
(1) Did the party to be estopped have incentive to vigorously 
litigate the first action; 
(2) if there is more than one judgment involved, are they 
consistent; 
(3) does the second action afford some procedural opportuni- 
ties unavailable in the first action; and finally 
(4) would application of issue preclusion otherwise be unfair 
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 29 comment b (1982). The qualifica- 
tions stated in section 28 apply to issue preclusion when it is invoked by a nonparty. 
When a nonparty invokes issue preclusion, however, greater weight may be given to the 
factors stated in section 28 and additional considerations may indicate the inappropri- 
ateness of imposing preclusion. 
See also In  re Air Crash Disaster at  Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1505, 1523 
(D. Colo. 1989) (fairness considerations are brought into special focus where "wait and 
see" claimants in mass tort litigation assert nonmutual offensive issue preclusion). 
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP JUDGMENTS 5 28 comments c-j (1982). These 
circumstances include consideration of whether: 
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible with 
an applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions involved; 
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party tigainst whom preclusion 
is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determination of the 
issue that were not available in the first action and could likely result in the issue 
being differently determined; 
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid unfavorable 
preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between himself and his 
present adversary; 
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with an- 
other determination of the same issue; 
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships among 
the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent action, or 
apparently were based on a compromise verdict or finding; 
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate determina- 
tion of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of another party 
thereto; 
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would 
inappropriately foreclose opportunity to obtain reconsideration of the legal rule 
upon which it was based; 
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party be 
permitted to relitigate the issue. 
Id. 5 29. 
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to the defendant.'17 
To these questions a New York appellate court added: 
"availability of new evidence, the use of initiative, the extent of 
a prior'litigation and the competence and experience of counsel 
. . . . 
9 , 1 1 8  
The "full and fair" opportunity to litigate inures to the 
party or the party's privies, and does not extend to the party's 
counsel. In the context of defensive issue preclusion, one federal 
trial court rejected a defendant asbestos ceiling tile manufac- 
turer's request that the plaintiff school district be estopped from 
pursuing its claims for punitive damages against defendant be- 
cause plaintiffs counsel had earlier litigated and lost a compara- 
ble claim on behalf of other plaintiffs.ll@ 
As in issue preclusion questions where there exists mutual- 
ity, proponents of nonmutual issue preclusion have succeeded in 
vesting preclusive effect in prior administrative determinations 
where the party against whom preclusion is sought had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue. For example, 
in Martin v. Ring,120 the court affirmed the trial court's directed 
verdict for defendant homeowner in a worker's negligence action 
arising from injuries suffered while working on the homeowner's 
porch. The trial court's directed verdict was based on an earlier 
Industrial Accident Board conclusion that plaintiffs injury was 
not due to the fall from defendant's porch. The appellate court 
concurred that the cause of plaintiffs back injury was both fully 
and fairly litigated before the Board, and was essential to its 
decision.121 
2 .  De Facto Privity 
Where the party against whom preclusion' is asserted was 
not a party to the earlier action or actions, courts have been re- 
luctant to impose issue preclusion merely because the parties to 
the first action share an identity of interests with the parties in 
117. Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311, 316 (D.N.J. 1989). 
118. See Sucher, 113 A.D.2d at 930, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 832. 
119. Hebron Pub. School Dist. No. 13 v. United States Gypsum CO., 723 F. Supp. 
416 (D.N.D. 1989). 
120. 401 Mass. 59, 514 N.E.2d 663 (1987). 
121. Id. at 62-63, 514 N.E.2d at 665. 
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the second. claiming that such an analysis "stretches 'privity' 
beyond meaningful limits," the Fifth Circuit in Hardy v. Johns- 
Manville Sales C ~ r p . ' ~ ~  identified three settings in which federal 
courts would recognize virtual or de facto privity. The two set- 
tings which are relevant to products liability actions are (1) 
where the nonparty " 'controlled the original suit"'; and (2) 
where the nonparty's " 'interests were represented adequately in 
the original suit.' The criterion of adequate representation in 
the prior suit has conventionally been limited to persons "some- 
how represented" in the earlier litigation,12' including "survi- 
vors, spouses, executors and the like of former parties."'26 An 
insured and an insurer will be considered to be in privity except 
where "the interests of the insured and insurer are antagonistic 
towards each other in an initial tort adjudicati~n." '~~ 
Consistent with the above, successive products liability ac- 
tions against different participants in the distributive chain 
should not be barred by res judicata upon proponent's simple 
claim that the retailer, wholesaler, and manufacturer are in priv- 
ity.12? Courts evaluating the relationship between and among the 
manufacturer and downstream sellers rely instead upon the 
"broader concept"1as of issue preclusion to prevent successive 
actions against retailers, manufacturers, and other sellers of the 
same product where plaintiffs raise the same factual issues of 
122. 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). 
123. Id at  339. (quoting Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 
95 (5th Cir. 1977)). The court in Hardy explains: "[Tlhe rationale for these excep- 
tions - all derived from Restatement (Second) of Judgments $ 5  30, 31, 34, 39-41 
(1982) - is obviously that in these instances the nonparty has in effect had his day in 
court." Id. 
124. See Hebron Pub. School Dist., 723 F. Supp. at  419. 
125. Id.; see infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
126. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Whatley, 558 So. 2d 120, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1990). For a criticism of this rule see infra notes 186-190 and accompanying text. 
127. Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 318 Pa. Super. 225, 233, 464 A.2d 
1313, 1317 (1983). The court stated; 
Privity for purposes of res judicata is not established by the mere fact that per- 
sons may be interested in the same question or in proving the same facts: The 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments applies principles of res judicata to different 
parties where one is vicariously responsible for the conduct of another, such as 
principal and agent or master and servant. Restatement (Second) of Judgments $ 
51 (1982). In such cases there is, in an important sense, a single claim. 
Id. 
128. Id. at  235, 464 A.2d at  1318. 
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defect or hazard that has been litigated previo~sly. '~~ 
A recurring phenomenon in mass tort actions is the speciali- 
zation of individual law firms in actions arising from the same 
allegedly toitious conduct. Whether the subject matter is 
pharmaceuticals, asbestos contamination, or otherwise, defend- 
ants in a contemporary action may find themselves defending 
against different claimants represented by the attorneys who 
prosecuted earlier claims on behalf of other plaintiffs. In such 
circumstances, defendants have sought to bar the later action on 
the grounds that the repeated presence of the same counsel for 
claimants constitutes plaintiffs' de facto representation in the 
earlier litigation. Defendant manufacturer of asbestos ceiling 
tiles raised this issue preclusion defense in Hebron Public 
School District u. United States Gypsum Co.,lS0 where the 
plaintiffs were represented by counsel who previously repre- 
sented other plaintiffs who were disappointed in their claim for 
punitive damages against the same defendant.131 The North Da- 
kota District Court refused to extend the concept of virtual rep- 
resentation to plaintiffs whose counsel litigated an earlier actioni 
calling it both an unwarranted extension of issue preclusion by 
earlier de facto representation beyond its conventional pre- 
c i n c t ~ ~ ~ ~  and an impermissible limitation upon plaintiffs' choice 
of 
129. E.g., Billman v. Nova Prods., 328 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (collat- 
eral estoppel precludes litigation against manufacturer of issues previously litigated 
against retaper); Meyer v. Droms, 68 A.D.2d 942, 944, 414 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (1979) (the . 
same effect, with the first action brought against the manufacturer and the second 
against the distributor). 
130. 723 F. Supp. 416 (D.N.D. 1989). 
131. Id. at  418-19. 
132. Id. a t  419. For example, barring claims by survivors, spouses, executors and the 
like of former parties. 
133. Id. The court noted: 
I t  is important to remember that the case is that of the client: a lawyer only serves 
as that client's advocate. Hebron cannot be bound by previous assertions of its 
lawyers on cases with which Hebron had no involvement. To allow such a result 
would only serve to limit the choice of legal aid available to parties. That the 
choice of counsel is to be left to the discretion of the client is established within 
our profession. 
Id. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (1980) (agree- 
ments restricting the practice of a lawyer are prohibited). 
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3. New Evidence or Different Evidentiary Rules 
Medical or scientific developments postdating the original 
action and material to plaintiffs prima facie case of causation, 
or defendant's response thereto, will suffice to permit a party's 
relitigation of an issue. In Zweig v. E.R. Squibb and Sons,lS4 the 
appellate court held that the prior jury verdict - that a drug 
used to prevent miscarriages had caused birth defects in the na- 
ture of limb reductions - did not collaterally estop the drug 
manufacturer from denying the same allegation in a new action 
in view of the new evidence that had developed since the previ- 
ous litigation. The plaintiff, an infant born with reduced limbs 
allegedly caused by his mother's ingestion of the drug while she 
was pregnant, .appealed a lower court decision that permitted 
the defendant to relitigate the issue of causation based on new 
evidence. Finding the new evidence material, the court held that 
where there was an absence of mutuality, issue preclusion should 
be applied "with a lighter hand" and replaced with a "more flex- 
ible approach" to limit application of the doctrine.lS6 Similarly, 
plaintiffs in Vincent v. Thompson,1S6 parents of a child who con- 
tracted encephalopathy following administration of defendant 
manufacturer's drug Quadrigen, defended, on appeal, the trial 
court's preclusion of the defendant Parke Davis' evidence on the 
issue of defect on the grounds that a prior suit had affirmed a 
judgment that a defective condition in the drug caused another 
plaintiffs illness and consequent brain damage.lS7 Among di- 
verse reasons for finding the trial court in error, the New York 
appellate court included the observation that, following the prior 
action, medical procedures were developed that permitted con- 
clusive testing for endotoxins which might leach from the dead 
pertussis bacilli in Quadrigen, providing defendant with expert 
evidence tending to disprove the presence of endotoxins "in any 
quantity sufficient to cause an untoward reaction in a human 
being."lSe 
134. 222 N.J. Super. 306, 536 A.2d 1280 (App. Div. 1988). 
135. Id. at 311-12, 536 A.2d at 1282-83. 
136. 50.A.D.2d 211, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1975). 
137. Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 411 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1969). 
138. See Vincent, 50 A.D.2d 211, 221, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 128 (1975). The court fur- 
ther stated: 
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Even without regard to divergent evidentiary rules, there is 
authority holding that the court in a subsequent action may 
deny issue preclusive effect to a prior ruling where the earlier 
trial court entered evidentiary rulings that the later court con- 
sidered prejudicial to a party. Significantly, section 29(2) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments has been interpreted to 
permit a court in a subsequent action to review evidentiary rul- 
ings of the first proceeding and, should it consider earlier rulings 
both erroneous and material to the outcome, deny the judgment 
issue preclusive effect. Reference may again be made to Zweig v. 
E.R. Squibb & Sons,lSB where the New Jersey appellate court 
affirmed a trial court's denial of preclusive effect to an earlier 
Utah jury's finding that the drug Delalutin caused a child's limb 
reduction. The New Jersey court concluded that the Utah jury's , 
consideration of "FDA-compelled" package inserts unfairly 
prejudiced defendant.140 
4. Capacity to Join 
As did the Supreme Court in P ~ r k l a n e , ~ ~ ~  the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments attaches significance to whether the 
party proposing or opposing "unfavorable preclusion" could 
have joined the present adversary in the first action by either 
intervention or joinder.14= The objective is to deny the advan- 
tages of issue preclusion to persons who failed to exercise joinder 
or intervention in the first action, choosing instead to lay "in 
wait, hoping to exploit a favorable judgment with no risk of be- 
ing bound by an unfavorable Decisions evaluating this 
assessment require more than the technical opportunity for join- 
der or intervention. They require that the opponent show that 
To  allow the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be used to deny to a defendant 
in a case such as this an opportunity to introduce evidence clearly relevant to a 
key issue in the case, the absence or existence of a causal relationship between the 
claimed defect in the product . . . and the injuries for which the plaintiffs are 
suing, is the use of that doctrine to deny such a defendant a complete and fair 
opportunity to litigate the very issue upon which its rights depend. 
Id. at 221, 377 N.Y.S.2d at  128. 
139. 222 N.J. Super. 306, 536 A.2d 1280,(App. Div. 1988). 
140. Id. a t  312, 536 A.2d at 1283. 
141. 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979). 
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 8 29(3) (1982). 
143. Murray v. Feight, 741 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1987). 
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joinder or intervention would have been a manifestly reasonable 
course for proponent. Murray v. FeightW4 illustrates that the in- 
quiry should not stop with the characterization of the initial ac- 
tion, but should proceed as well to parse the discrete factual is- 
sues decided there~nder."~ In the appeal, the court rejected 
plaintiffs claim that the defendants should have brought their 
tort and contract claims in the original lien priority litigation, 
agreeing with the lower court that the later tort and contract 
claims were "entirely foreign to the nature of the original 
case."14@ As meaningful was the Murray court's second rationale 
for not estopping the proponent's application for issue preclu- 
sion: the defendant's personal circumstances at the time of the 
first action, including the loss of their baby daughter, would 
make it most extraordinary' for them to have begun "major liti- 
gation a t  that time.""' Likewise, a prior party's failure to lodge 
a permissive counterclaim in the initial action will not operate to 
estop its later litigation of a factum probandum within the first 
a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
144. Id. at  1155. 
145. E.g., Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal. 3d 903, 718 P.2d 
920, 226 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1986). The court held that a prior determination pertinent to the 
issue of vicarious liability, i.e., whether or not Noyes was an employee of Producers, 
collaterally estopped a later dispute as to his status as an "employee" within the mean- 
ing of an exclusion to the carrier's policy. The court held that the issue of employment 
status determined in an antecedent tort action was indistinguishable from the interpre- 
tation of employment status in the subsequent action alleging the carrier's breach of the 
duty to defend. Id. at  911, 718 P.2d at  924, 226 Cal. Rptr. at  562. The court also 
commented: 
[Tlhere is no significant difference in meaning between the term "employee" as 
used in the third party tort liability context and Sentry's insurance policy. The 
employment status issue is identical in the two situations. . . . 
. . . .  
Because all the elements of collateral estoppel were met, we conclude that 
appellants [herein] are precluded from relitigating the issue of whether Noyes was 
an employee of Producers. 
Id. 
146. See Murray, 741 P.2d a t  1154. 
147. Id. at  1155. 
148. East Tex. Motor Freight Lines v. Freeman, 289 Ark. 539, 713 S.W.2d 456 
(1986). In that case, defendant East Texas Motor Freight sought to bar Ms. Freeman's 
personal injury claims against the carrier because Ms. Freeman had intervened in the 
original action against a farmer whose field burning created a road hazard and conse- 
quent highway accident. Finding that Ms. Freeman was free to press her claims in state 
court, notwithstanding an earlier federal judgment finding the farmer entirely a t  fault, 
the court explained: 
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5. Nonmutual Defensive Preclusion 
The doctrine of issue preclusion can be used defensively by 
a defendant against a plaintiff who had previously "litigated and 
lost."14B Acceptance of this doctrine is tied principally to the 
economies its application achieves, for courts and litigants alike, 
as defensive issue preclusion will often operate to dispose of an 
entire action.lS0 Courts endorsing nonmutual defensive issue 
preclusion have required that: 
(1) the issues in both proceedings must be identical, (2) the issue 
in the prior proceeding must have been actually litigated and ac- 
tually decided, (3) there must have been a full and fair opportu- 
nity for litigation in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previ- 
ously litigated must have been necessary to support a valid and 
final judgment on the merits.161 
For example, in Johnson v. Eli Lilly & Co.lSa ["Johnson II"], an 
action against a drug manufacturer for injuries sustained by 
plaintiff as a result of her mother's ingestion of DES during 
pregnancy, the court held that the judgment in one of two ear- 
lier actions brought by plaintiff against the same manufacturer 
should have preclusive effect. The court found that the prior ac- 
tion contained the same issue to be decided in the subsequent 
proceeding, i.e., "whether the decision in Johnson I precludes an 
action brought on the same facts under the New York revivor 
Here, . . . Mrs. Freeman was joined [in the federal action] only for purposes of 
contribution. Mrs. Freeman was not obligated to counter-claim against ETMF in 
the federal action because of her pending state claim. See F.R.C.P. 13(a). More- 
over, the attempt to consolidate her claims pending in state court with the federal 
action was rejected by the federal judge. Hence, the issues involving the liability 
of ETMF for the injuries and property claims of the appellees, [including Mrs. 
Freeman], had not been litigated prior to the trial in Crittenden County. 
Id. a t  543, 713 S.W.2d at  459. 
149. See generally Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill 
Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141, 
149 (1985). 
150. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY $ 5514 (T. Travers 3d ed. 1987). 
151. Johnson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 689 F. Supp. 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Gelb v. 
Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1986)); cf. Fireside Motors v. Nissan Motor 
Corp., 395 Mass. 366,372, 479 N.E.2d 1386, 1390 n.6 (1985) (where the supreme judicial 
court states the general requirement of party mutuality and notes that they have permit- 
ted nonmutual application of collateral estoppel where there has been a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue). 
152. 689 F. Supp. 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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The courts uniformly hold that the issue for which preclu- 
sion is sought must be identical to that decided in the earlier 
proceeding. For example, in Sucher v. Kutscher's Country 
Club,16' an action arising from a club patron's fall from a chair 
lift, plaintiff brought suit against the country club which, in 
turn, impleaded the vendor who, in turn, impleaded the manu- 
facturer, American Starr ~ l i d e r  Corporation. The vendor and 
the manufacturer were granted summary judgment. The country 
club did not appeal, but filed a new third-party complaint 
against the manufacturer, alleging the chairlift was "placed . . . 
'into the stream of commerce in a defective and dangerous con- 
diti~n.'"'~~ American Starr Glider moved to dismiss the com- 
plaint on grounds of collateral estoppel, citing the grant of sum- 
mary judgment in the first action. Noticing that the prior action 
involved the manufacturer as a fourth party, not brought in by 
the present plaintiff, the Second Department concluded that the 
particular issue of unreasonable danger and defective condition 
had not yet been litigated.lbe In addition, the court noted the 
club's introduction of new evidence, a design evaluation report 
not proposed until three months 'after decision on the earlier 
summary judgment motion, and held that "on this record, it was 
' 
an improvident exercise of discretion to apply collateral estoppel 
to bar the instant comp1aint."l6' 
Defensive issue preclusion will not be applied where the 
court discerns that its operation would deprive the claimant of a 
full and fair hearing. In Lynch v. Merrell-National Laborato- 
ries,lb8 the First Circuit, in considering the effect of summary 
judgment for the manufacturer in a prior federal court decision 
on a later state court suit, declined to preclude plaintiffs' litiga- 
tion of the issue because plaintiffs had not had a "fair opportu- 
nity to litigate [because] they understood that their withdrawal 
from the consolidated action would not prejudice them."1Sa The 
153. Id. at 174. 
154. 113 A.D.2d 928, 493 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1985). 
155. Id. at 929, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 831. 
156. Id.  at 931, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 833. 
157. Id.  at 933, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 834. 
158. 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (a Bendectin action). 
159. Id.  at 1191. In that action, a Massachusetts plaintiff agreed to transfer her case 
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court stated that plaintiffs' "freedom to withdraw" from the 
original suit and file. the action anew in Boston "was not 
illusory."160 
6. Offensive Nonmutual Preclusion 
The Supreme Court first countenanced offensive nonmutual 
preclusion in Parklane Hosiery u. Shore,161 a securities fraud 
case. There the Court adopted a two-prong test to allow plain- 
tiffs in a stockholder class action, who were strangers to the first 
lawsuit, to estop the defendants from relitigating whether a 
proxy statement was false and misleading. The Court considered 
whether the plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier ac- 
tion and whether any unfairness to the defendant might result 
before it decided to apply the estoppel. Significantly, the Court 
stated that the apparent virtues of permitting defensive use of 
issue preclusion are less evident in its offensive application, giv- 
ing only "guarded end~r semen t " '~~  to offensive use of issue pre- 
clusion due to its vulnerability to plaintiff abuse.lB3 
In products liability litigation, nonmutual offensive issue 
to Ohio for consolidated discovery. When given the option, at a later date, to remove the 
case to Massachusetts, plaintiff opted to do so. The consolidated cases proceeded to trial 
in Ohio, where the jury found for the defendant. In Massachusetts, defendant then 
moved for summary judgment based upon issue preclusion. Plaintiff-appellant appealed 
from the trial court's entry of summary judgment. 
160. Id. a t  1193. 
161. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
162. See id. at  328. 
163. Id. a t  329-30. The Court explained: 
[Olffensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy in the 
same manner as defensive use does. . . . Offensive use of collateral estoppel, [does 
not create a strong incentive to join all adversaries in the first action, but rather] 
creates precisely the opposite incentive. Since a plaintiff will be able to rely upon 
a previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment 
if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a "wait and see" 
attitude, in the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a 
favorable judgment. Thus offensive use of collateral estoppel will likely increase 
rather than decrease the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs will 
have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
In products liability suits, the converse may be more true. Historical judicial parsi- 
mony in permitting nonmutual offensive issue preclusion often cannot be reconciled with 
practical considerations of fairness in many products liability actions. See discussion in- 
fra at  Conclusion. 
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preclusion has bolstered claimants' actions against defendant 
manufacturers and sellers. In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. u. 
Jeppesen & Co.,lB4 the court allowed insurance companies, 
which acted as subrogees of an airline that settled actions by the 
heirs of airline passengers killed in an airline crash, to assert col- 
lateral estoppel against the manufacturer of an approach plate 
used by the pilots even though they were not parties to the first 
action. The court held the cases involved identical issues of 
whether the manufacturer produced a faulty approach plate, 
whether its use by the pilots was the proximate cause of the 
crash, and whether the pilots were guilty of contributory negli- 
gence in their use of the approach plate. 
From the general issue preclusion rule requiring an unam- 
biguous prior finding of fact,lB6 it follows a fortiori that inconsis- 
tent prior holdings upon the same issue militates against grant- 
ing preclusive effect. Consistently, in the appeal of an action in 
which a manufacturer of DES sought to litigate certain issues, 
including causation, relating to its liability for injuries allegedly 
caused to the plaintiff by the use of the drug by the plaintiffs 
mother, plaintiffs sought to use the doctrine of collateral estop- 
pel to preclude the defendant manufacturer's introduction of ev- 
idence on these issues on the grounds .they were "fully" litigated 
at a prior trial. The trial court allowed the preclusion. On ap- 
peal, the court in Kortenhaus 'u. Eli Lilly & Co.,lBB held that 
while collateral estoppel is a rule of efficiency and may be ap- 
plied in products liability actions, it is fundamental to its use 
that the earlier decision be reliable and substantially correct.lB7 
The New Jersey appeals court pointed out that jury verdicts re- 
garding the manufacturer's liability had been inconsistent in 
prior verdicts, adding that "application of offensive collateral es- 
toppel in the face of inconsistent verdicts is antithetical to the 
very basis of the rule . . . . ,,I68 
The Supreme Court in Parklane and the Restatement (Sec- 
ond) of Judgments section 29(2) 11982), alike, state that non- 
164. 440 F. Supp. 394 (D. Nev. 1977). 
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 27 (1982). 
166. 228 N.J. Super. 162, 549 A.2d 437 (App. Div. 1988). 
167. Id .  at 166, 549 A.2d at 439. 
168. I d .  at 168, 549 A.2d at 440. 
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mutual offensive issue preclusion may be in appropriate where 
the opponent can demonstrate that, in the prior forum, it suf- 
fered from procedural or evidential disabilities that were out- 
come determinative in the sense that in the latter forum the op- 
ponent might, under different procedure or rule of law, secure a 
different result.lee In United States v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals 
Corp.,170 an in rem action involving the pharmaceutical manu- 
facturer's product Fiorinal with Codeine, the trial court ruled 
that the manufacturer was collaterally estopped from litigating 
the issue of whether the product was a "new drug" within the 
meaning of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.'?' The court en- 
tered a permanent injunction and ordered the product seized 
and destroyed, and the manufacturer appealed. The Sixth Cir- 
cuit applied a materiality standard to respondent pharmaceuti- 
cal manufacturer's argument that the prior New Jersey proceed- 
ing failed to provide a full and fair opportunity for it to prove 
that the product was not a "new drug," concluding that "there is 
no evidence that the New Jersey forum was more inconvenient 
than Ohio or that it deprived Sandoz of any procedural opportu- 
nities available in Ohio."17a 
E. Discrete Fairness Questions in Products Liability Issue 
Preclusion 
The discussion above provides a backdrop for the author's 
suggestion that the fairness of issue preclusion is particularly 
questionable in three areas distinctive to tort and products lia- 
bility litigation. 
1. Claimant Knowledge or Expertise Affecting Degree of 
Risk 
In both offensive and defensive issue preclusion contexts, 
fact-specific qualities of the risk to claimant and the cause of 
claimant's injury often invite the conclusion that preclusive ef- 
fect should not be granted a prior judgment. For example, in 
169. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330-31; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 29(2) 
(1982). 
170. 894 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1990). 
171. 21 U.S.C. 5 321(p) (Supp. 1990). 
172. 894 F.2d at 828 (citing Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332). 
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Deviner v. Electrolux Motor,178 the appellate court reviewed the 
district court's denial of appellant's motion for a directed verdict 
based upon issue preclusion, relying upon an earlier decision by 
the same court upholding a jury finding of defectiveness in the 
same model of defendant's chain saw.17' In approving the trial 
court's denial of a directed verdict, the Eleventh Circuit stated 
its unwillingness to grant unmeasured expansion of the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel beyond its original precincts.l7%egarding 
chain saw design defect litigation in particular, the court con- 
cluded that for such products, factual distinctions in the circum- 
stances giving rise to claimants' injuries compromised the confi- 
dence that could be reposed in any single prior verdict. Among 
other variables, the court mentioned "the skill, experience, con- 
ditions in the workplace, objectives to be accomplished in execu- 
tion of the task a t  hand, and modus operandi of the chain saw 
operator in each instance."17e 
Comparable considerations led the Ohio Supreme Court in 
Goodson v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.17' to suggest the 
unsuitability of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel on the 
issue of defective design for mass-produced products "when the 
injuries arise out of distinct underlying incidents."178 In Good- 
son, suit was brought on behalf of a four-year-old child who was 
injured when her foot slipped beneath a riding lawnmower. At 
trial, plaintiffs moved successfully for summary judgment 
against the manufacturer on the issue of the manufacturer's de- 
sign liability, citing an earlier holding involving similar injuries 
in which a jury found McDonough Power Equipment liable for 
negligent design in failing to properly guard the mower's rotat- 
173. 844 F.2d 769 ( l l th  Cir. 1988).. 
174. Nettles v. Electrolux Motor, 784 F.2d 1574 ( l l th  Cir. 1986). 
175. Deoiner. 844 F.2d 769. The court noted: 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel developed in patent cases and isuseful in 
preventing the relitigation of questions once thoroughly canvassed and deter- 
mined, such as the validity of a patent. I t  should not be extended indiscriminately 
to tort cases where the factual circumstances in each case differ and no hard and 
fast legal standard has emerged from the developing case law. 
Id. at 774 (footnotes omitted). 
176. Id. 
177. 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983). 
178. Id. at  204, 443 N.E.2d at  988. 
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ing blade.17e Noting first the general factors a court might con- 
sider in determining the suitability of nonmutual offensive issue 
preclusion,1e0 the Ohio Supreme Court stated that a court's diffi- 
culties in concluding that "the identical issue was actually de- 
cided in the former case"lB1 are "multiplied" in design defect lit- 
igation "where the issue determined in the first litigation relates 
to a product's design."lel A t  the threshold, differences in the 
negligence law of Ohio and that of Florida, the forum of the ear- 
lier suit would affect "the differing trial techniques and appel- 
late determinations that would have been made by legal counsel . 
. . . ."leS The Court continued by stating various accident-spe- 
cific issues that might affect the degree of risk posed by the 
product, including: "different operators of the equipment with 
perhaps totally different mechanical capabilities [and] different 
terrain and weather conditions . . . . 9 9 1 8 4  
179. Id. a t  194,443 N.E.2d at  980 (citing Harrison v. McDonough Power Equip., 381 
F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Fla. 1974)) (denying motion for judgment n.0.v.). 
180. Id. a t  201, 443 N.E.2d at  986. The court summarized the following "factors" as 
appropriate for consideration: 
There are the tangible, as well as the intangible, elements which have their mean- 
ingful effect upon the result of any cause, the nature of the claim and the claim- 
ants, as well as the nature of the defendant; the amount involved in such claim; 
the manner of the advocacy, often depending upon the amounts involved in such 
cause; the philosophical elements surrounding the cause; the agreed settlement, if 
any, in the matter; the vast differences between juries and their determinations of 
issues of liability and damages; and the unwillingness to appeal a verdict, if such 
would not be feasible. 
Id. 
181. Id. a t  203, 443 N.E.2d at 987 (citing 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER. FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4416-17 (1981)). 
182. Id. The court explains: 
This is due t o  the nature of the questions and the potentially broad impact of 
their resolution. These questions are very technical, requiring expert testimony to 
bring out the specifics. Also, a jury's ultimate determination requires delicate bal- 
ancing between the design decisions actually made by the manufacturer and those 
which are postulated as feasible within the industry at  any given point in time. 
Id. 
183. Id. at  203-04, 443 N.E.2d at 988. 
184. Id. 
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2. Privity 
a. The Insurer-Insured Relationship 
In products. liability litigation, the actual, as distinct from 
formal, relationship between an insurance carrier and its insured 
raises genuine concerns about the presumptive privity relation- 
ship between them. The virtues apparent in finding a privity re- 
lationship in furtherance of the single recovery rulelS6 or the 
rules governing joinder of partieslSe are altogether absent in a 
variety of other carrier-insured relationships. Counsel with any 
significant contact with insurer-insured litigation know that the 
insured's relationship with the carrier is, in turn, remote and 
fragile. In the realities of primary litigation against a tortfeasor 
and insurance declaratory judgment actions alike, the carrier 
and the insured are in privity only in the technical, contractual 
sense. In a primary action against the tortfeasor, brought nomi- 
nally by the insured but actually by the carrier, the insurer en- 
joys virtually complete authority over the conduct of the litiga- 
tion, with which the insured trammels only at the risk of having 
the carrier deem him nonc~operative.'~~ The sprawling national 
litigation brought by insured sellers of asbestos, pharmaceuticals 
and other products against their insurers seeking declaratory 
judgment as to the carrier's duties to defend and indemnifylS8 
185. See, e.g., Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 15 Conn. App. 392, 546 A.2d 284 
(1988). The court noted: "the present case involves the issues of whether defensive col- 
lateral estoppel principles and whether the paramount principle of tort law that a plain- 
tiff may be compensated only once for his injuries should be employed." Id. at  396-97 
n.5, 546 A.2d at  287 n.5. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court confirmed that sat- 
isfaction of the one judgment foreclosed plaintiff from further litigating claims for the 
same injuries. Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 211 Conn. 67, 68-70, 557 A.2d 540, 542-44 
(1989). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS 5 48, at  330-31 (5th ed. 1984). 
186. E.g., Childers v. Eastern Foam Prods., 94 F.R.D. 53 (N.D. Ga. 1982). 
187. E.g., Daniel v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 506 A.2d 1032 (R.I. 1986). The court 
found: "Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff without consider- 
ing the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, the trial justice prop- 
erly concluded that since plaintiff neither substantidly complied with nor cooperated 
with defendant insurer, she was barred from recovery under the policy." Id.  
188. See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 1986 Fire & 
Casualty (CCH) 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1986): 
Plaintiff argues that the Pre-Revision Policies should be interpreted so that cover- 
age would be triggered when "exposure" to DES occurred during a policy period. . 
. . Defendant contends that those of its policies which provided coverage for prod- 
uct liabilities for "accidents" occurring during a policy year were triggered when 
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support the argument that a carrier's relationship with its in- 
sured is one of privity in only a formal sense. 
The chimerical nature of carrier "privity" with insureds or 
third-party beneficiaries is highlighted in Costa v. Liberty Mu- 
tual Insurance Co.,lSe a decision laudable in its candor if not its 
fairness. In Costa, plaintiff below, an employee injured while 
working his employer's "mangle" machine, successfully pursued 
his workers' compensation remedies and received medical pay- 
ments, disability payments, rehabilitation services, and a lump 
sum settlement from Liberty Mutual, the workers' compensation 
carrier. Liberty Mutual never advised Costa, who consulted no 
independent lawyer, of his potential remedy in products liability 
against Morrison Textile Machinery Co., the manufacturers of 
the "mangle" machine. "Liberty's tepid enthusiasm for pursuing 
Morrison was understandable," the appeals court later noted, for 
Liberty Mutual "was also Morrison's insurer."1e0 
After learning that his potential claim against the manufac- 
turer was barred by the applicable limitations period, Mr. Costa 
sued Liberty Mutual, claiming that the carrier breached a duty 
, to advise him of his right to pursue independently a claim 
against Morrison. Rebuffing the employee's claim, the appeals 
court stated that the state's workers' compensation scheme "ap- 
parently assumed an adversary relationship between the insurer 
and the employee claimant, rather than a fiduciary relation- 
ship," and concluded also that the applicable statute "does not 
seem to contemplate that the insurer will give tutorial on the 
subject [of potential independent actions against the manufac- 
turer] to the employee."lel Putting aside the venality of Costa, 
the limited fact finding objectives of workers' compensation 
tribunals tacitly discourage employee claimants from preparing 
and presenting evidence and legal argument that look beyond 
the findings of the administrative board to their potential 
preclusive effect upon later independent tort claims.1ea Given its 
an injury manifested itself, not when an insured's drug is used by a claimant. 
Id. at 1354-55. 
189. 29 Mass. App. Ct. 176, 558 N.E.2d 999 (1990). 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. See infra notes 202-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of issue preclu- 
sion and workers' compensation proceedings. 
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due, Costa cuts further against the argument that a workers' 
compensation proceeding provides an employee with the oppor- 
tunity and incentive to fully and fairly litigate claims that might 
be pursued in any later products liability action. 
b. Spousal Privity and Derivative Claims for Loss of 
Consortium 
In tort actions, one spouse's personal injury suit against a 
product seller may be accompanied by the other spouse's claim 
for loss of cons~rt ium. '~~ The consortium claim for "loss of con- 
jugal fellowship and sexual relations"'@' is considered derivative 
of the personal injury claim,le6 and, in most jurisdictions, the 
consortium loss claimant will be time-barred if the action is not 
brought within the limitations period applicable to the personal 
injury claimant.le6 
A conventional recognition of spousal privity in a products 
liability issue preclusion context is Johnston v. Allis-Chalmers 
Corp.,le7 where a Missouri appellate court held that an adverse 
jury verdict on a spouse's claim for loss of consortium precluded 
her direct claim for personal injuries suffered when the defend- 
ant's farm implement carrier disengaged from its towing vehicle 
and struck their car. In the appeal of that action, the appellate 
court found that the trial court erroneously prevented the jury 
from hearing the physical injury claim of Mary Johnston,le8 but 
declined to order a new trial because, in. the court's view, the 
adverse jury verdict on her husband's strict liability claim and 
193. See generally Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441,563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. 
Rptr. 302 (1977). 
194. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382,385,525 P.2d 669,670, 115 
Cal. Rptr. 765, 766 (1974). 
195. See generally STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY, PERBONU INJURY AND DEATH AC- 
TIONS Ch. 13 (1972). 
196. J. LEE & B. LINDAHL, 3 MODERN TORT LAW $ 29.17 (1990) ("The same statute of 
limitations which applies to the impaired spouse's claim may also apply to the deprived 
spouse's consortium claim." (citing Titze v. Miller, 337 N.W.2d 176 (S.D. 1983))); 
cf. Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wash. 2d 761, 733 P.2d 530 (1987) (spouse's 
claim in loss of consortium accrues when she experiences her compensable loss, not nec- 
essarily contemporaneous with the onset of injury of the physically impaired spouse). 
197. 736 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987). 
198. Id. at  548 ("[Tlhere was enough evidence from the surrounding circumstances 
and the lack of prior medical history to make Mary's claim submissible."). 
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her "derivative" claim in loss of consortium "foreclosed any 
right to relief' from either the manufacturer or the distributor 
of the towing vehicle.lee 
In Johnston, both husband and wife suffered physical in- 
jury. In the setting of a particular litigation, therefore, it was not 
unreasonable to conclude that, the trial court's error withal, 
both husband and wife had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue of the claimed defective condition of the towing vehi- 
cle. Therein resides the logic of binding the wife by the 
factfinder's conclusion that the husband failed to prove strict li- 
ability. As or more frequently, the consortium claimant will not 
have been physically injured in the mishap, and will instead pur: 
sue a consortium claim for intangible loss that is secondaryzo0 to 
the physical injury. claim of the other spouse. In this latter set- 
ting, courts should not assume the consortium claimant's virtual 
representation by the physically injured spouse as a justification 
for granting preclusive effect to one or more resolutions reached 
in the first judgment. 
In the context of ordinary civil litigation, the consortium 
party's claim is parasitic to that of the personally injured 
spouse. Given the consortium claimant's altogether different evi- 
dentiary burden in the original acti~n,~.Ol it would be most un- 
usual for the consortium claimant to introduce evidence of the 
dangerously defective nature of the product and its causal con- 
nection with the other claimant's personal injuries. Taken to- 
gether with the practical primacy vested in the physical injury 
claim, these considerations commend reevaluation of any rule 
binding a consortium claimant by issues determined as to cause 
or causes of action for physical injury. 
199. Id.  
200. The term "secondary" is used in its strategic, rather than legal sense. The con- 
sortium claim is secondary in that the parties, counsel, and the fact finder ordinarily 
consider the claim of liability for physical injury to be the principal cause of action. 
201. The consortium spouse's evidentiary burden is typically that of showing dam- 
age to qualities of the marital relationship that have been summarized as including "the 
loss of love, companionship, society, sexual relations, and household services." Borer v. 
American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441,443, 563 P.2d 858, 860, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (1977). 
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3. Quasi- Judicial Determinations 
The majority of workers' compensation administrative 
boards are charged with determining whether contested compen- 
sation claims involved injury suffered or disease contracted "in 
the course of and arising out of [the claimant's] employment."202 
The workers' compensation model represents two principal bar- 
gained-for exchanges: (1) in exchange for a relatively prompt 
compensation for actual expenses associated with work-related 
injuries, the employee forbears any claim in negligence against 
the employer; and (2) in exchange for immunity from negligence 
claims brought by injured workers, employers underwrite an es- 
sentially no-fault compensation scheme for out-of-pocket costs 
of work-related injury.203 
Although workers' compensation boards are court-like "in 
legal effect,"204 to accomplish the principal goal of compensation, 
administrative procedures in workers' compensation make sub- 
stantial accommodations to economy and celerity. The jurisdic- 
tion of the workers' compensation tribunal is limited to findings 
of fact and conclusions of law pertaining to whether the claim 
arose "out of and in the course of employment."206 Explicit limi- 
tations are placed upon the appellate review of board findings of 
202. E.g., D.C. CODE § 36-301(12)(Rev. 1988), which provides: 
"Injury" means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of em- 
ployment, and such occupational. disease or infection as arises naturally out of 
such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental in- 
jury, and includes an injury caused by the willful act of third persons directed 
against an employee because of his employment. 
See generally J .  NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION 9-11 (1987). 
203. See, e.g., D.C. CODE 8 36-304(a), (b) (1988), which provides in pertinent part: 
(a) The liability of an employer . . . shall be exclusive and in place of all 
liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or 
wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover 
damages from such employer at  law on account of such injury or death. 
(b) The compensation to which an employee is entitled under this chapter 
shall constitute the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer . . . for any 
illness, injury, or death arising out of and in the course of his employment . . . . 
See generally J .  HENDERSON &-R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS Ch. 9 (1987). 
204. 2B A. LARSON. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW $ 77A.26 at  15-17 (1988) (quot- 
ing Frement Indem. Corp. v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 153 Cal. App. 3d 965, 200 Cal. 
Rptr. 762 (1984)). 
205. Cf. NACKLEY, supra note 202, a t  59 ("The power of a state workers' compensa- 
tion agency to hear disputes is limited by the terms of the applicable state statute and 
by due process of law and other constitutional restrictions."). 
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fact.200 In the proceedings themselves, a "rule of informality" 
obtains, and thus, compared with proceedings before courts of 
general jurisdiction, workers' compensation boards employ gen- 
erally relaxed rules of notice and pleading.207 
Hearsay and even incompetent evidence is admis~ible,2~~ 
and indeed, the rules of evidence are so relaxed that workers' 
compensation findings are more likely to be reversed for failure 
to admit evidence than for denying admission to evidence.20B 
Employee claimants frequently appear on their own behalf, 
without co~nsel ."~ 
The specialized role of workers' compensation as a compen- 
sation system administered by agencies in a quasi-judicial capac- 
ity should disable any issue preclusive effect of such judgments 
in later tort actions against the manufacturer or other third par- 
ties. Agency findings and appellate affirmations that an injury 
was, or was not, sustained in the course of employment, merit 
conclusive effect, as ceding to compensation panels finality in 
deciding this issue is integral to the bargained-for exchange be- 
tween employee and employer to forego tort remedies in return 
for expedited compensation for work-related injuries. However, 
grave fairness questions arise from giving preclusive effect to any 
other holdings a board may consider within its ancillary jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . ~ l '  In deciding the work-relatedness of an injury, for exam- 
ple, a board may have to reach conclusions on issues such as 
identification of the product or instrumentality causing claim- 
ant's injury, or the claimant's incautious conduct short of inten- 
206. NACKLEY, supra note 202, at  7, 77-78 ("[Alppealable issues are often limited to 
allowance of claims or of medical conditions."). 
207. See LARSON. supra note 204, 3 77A.00, at  15-1 ("Compensation procedure is 
generally as summary and informal as is compatible with an orderly investigation of the 
merits."). 
208. Id.  3 79.11, a t  15-426.33 to 15-426.36 (incompetent evidence admissible). 
209. Id.  1 79.12, at  15-426.42 ("Ordinarily the only way in which a mistake on ad- 
missibility as such could amount to reversible error would be by the exclusion of admissi- 
ble evidence, rather than by the admission of incompetent evidence."). 
210. See, e.g., Fisher v. Industrial Comm'n, 20 Ariz. App. 155, 510 P.2d 1060 (1973) 
(claimant's self-representation not grounds for reversal). 
211. It  is accepted generally that a compensation panel may decide issues ancillary 
to its findings concerning work-relatedness where such findings are necessary to support 
its rationale. See NACKLEY, supra note 202, at  59 ("[r]esolution of issues that are neces- 
sary incidents to other powers granted . . . will be upheld as 'clearly implied,' even if such 
power was not expressly granted by statute."). 
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tional misc~nduct."~ It  does not, however, follow that findings 
on such ancillary matters should be accorded preclusive effect in 
later tort actions, for given the primary purpose, the limited par- 
ties, and the informality of workers' compensation proceedings, 
it would be quite unlikely for a claimant to anticipate and assert 
or defend fact issues solely because of the potential relevance of 
such issues in a later tort action against third parties. 
The indefensible nature of such an approach is illustrated in 
Brown u. Dow Chemical Co.?lS a tort action in which plaintiff 
claimed that his workplace exposure to the chemical compound 
dibromochlorpropane (DBCP) rendered him sterile.a14 In his 
preceding claim for workers' compensation, Brown prevailed 
before the Administrative Law Judge, only to have the Arkansas 
Workers' Compensation Commission reverse, on the grounds 
that, in the underlying trial-type proceeding, Brown had failed 
to establish "a causal connection between his exposure to the 
DBCP and his lowered fertility."alWpon appeal to the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals, the Compensation Commission's reversal was 
undis t~rbed.~ '~ Thereafter, Brown and his wife sued Dow Chem- 
ical Company, co-holder of the patent for the chemical, in strict 
liability and negligence. Dow moved successfully for summary 
judgment, with the federal trial court agreeing that Brown was 
collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of Dow's causal 
contribution ,to his injury. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit af- 
firmed, finding that the Compensation Commission "made a 
conclusive finding as to the causation issue."a17 
The unfairness of binding Brown by the Commission's ob- 
servations on "causation" is betrayed by simple review of the 
212. In most jurisdictions compensation may be denied to claimants whose conduct 
is intentional or willful. E.g., D.C. CODE 5 36-303(d) (1981) ("Liability for compensation 
shall not apply where injury to the employee was occasioned solely by his intoxication or 
by his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another."). 
213. 875 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1989). 
214. Within the first year of taking employment at  Velsico Chemical's El Dorado, 
Arkansas facility, Brown was advised that "exposure to DBCP might' lead to sterility." 
Id. at  198. 
215. Id. a t  199 (quoting the Commission's judgment). 
216. Id. a t  198. 
217. Id. at  199. The appellate court added that even if, for the sake of argument, 
"the administrative order were not entitled to preclusive effect, the reviewing court's 
[the Arkansas Court of Appeals] decision would be." Id. 
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means by which the employee pressed his claim before the 
agency. Brown's solitary proffer of expert evidence on the causa- 
tion issue was a written "Summary Report" from a Dr. Meyer, 
Director of the Occupational Health Clinic a t  the University of 
Cincinnati Medical School. In the Report, Dr. Meyer stated that 
Brown's sterility ".occurred directly as a result of [his exposure] 
to high concentrations of DBCP" at his place of employment.21e 
Before the Board, Brown's proof was arguably well-suited as evi- 
dence sufficient to support a finding in a workers' compensation 
proceeding, and indeed, the Administrative Law Judge ruled in 
Brown's favor. However, his evidence scarcely resembled, in ei- 
ther quality or quantum, what a toxic tort plaintiff would pre- 
sent in a products liability suit. The deduction is inescapable 
that in the agency proceeding Brown did not anticipate the po- 
tential issue preclusive effect of the agency's holding. Nor, for 
that matter, should he reasonably have been expected to. 
In its seeming invitation for full-regalia litigation of com- 
plex causation issues in workers' compensation proceedings, the 
implications of Brown loom large. The better rule would be to 
confine the issue preclusive effect of workers' compensation deci- 
sions to issues necessary to the boards' objectives, i.e., determi- 
nations of jurisdiction, existence of the employment relation, 
character of the employment, the employer's insured status, and 
the work-relatedness of the injury or disease.a1B 
111. Conclusion 
Nonmutual defensive issue preclusion is more likely than its 
offensive counterpart to trench upon plaintiffs right to pursue 
tort or warranty remedies for personal injury or property loss. 
Conversely, nonmutual offensive issue preclusion should enjoy 
expanded application, and can do so in harmony with the recog- 
nized objectives of judicial economy and fairness to the litigants. 
These propositions are based primarily upon recognition 
that individual products liability claimants are rarely equally 
circumstanced with defendants. The individual plaintiff and his 
counsel, or even carrier counsel, is more likely to approach the 
218. Id. at 198. 
219. See LARSON, supra note 204, $ 15-426.272(65)-(80). 
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initial action with the laudable, but limited, objective of ob- 
taining compensation for plaintiffs injuries. In prominent mass 
claims against sellers of notoriously hazardous products, lead 
counsel may have developed the resources and expertise to fash- 
ion a litigation strategy that will advantage present and future 
claimants alike. In most suits, however, the transitory involve- 
ment of plaintiffs counsel with the product-specific subject mat- 
ter makes it unlikely that decisions as to claims, evidence, settle- 
ment or appeals will contemplate the effect of the original action 
upon claims and issues advanced by claimants in later actions. 
Conversely, it would be rare for the defense counsel of a national 
manufacturer or marketer to fail to review every litigation deci- 
sion with an eye towards the effect upon later and similar law- 
suits that may be anticipated from any systemic product 
problem. 
Whether or not one accepts these observations, application 
of the related doctrines of res judicata and issue preclusion oper- 
ate effectively to limit litigation time and expense to that neces- 
sary to afford justice to the parties. The contribution of issue 
preclusion to the objectives of judicial economy and fairness to 
the parties would be enhanced by the express recognition of cer- 
tain qualities unique to products liability litigation. 
As discussed above, products liability-specific questions af- 
fecting the appropriateness of precluding issue relitigation arise 
most frequently in two contexts. First, issue resolution in design 
defect or failure to warn actions in which the knowledge, exper- 
tise or conduct of the particular claimant affect the degree of 
risk posed by the product is less suited to application of issue 
preclusion than is issue resolution in actions where the product 
risk is uniform, rendering the individual claimant's knowledge or 
circumspection irrelevant. I t  follows that neither offensive nor 
defensive issue preclusion is ordinarily appropriate where plain- 
tiff knowledge or conduct operates to enlarge or diminish the 
risk of product use. 
Second, application of orthodox privity criteria to bar sub- 
sequent issue litigation by parties technically, but not opera- 
tively, in privity with parties to earlier suits, beclouds considera- 
tion of the estopped party's actual earlier opportunity and 
incentive to litigate. Any presumption of the alignment of a 
spousal consortium claimant's litigation strategy with that of the 
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physically injured spouse is based more upon the common law 
fiction of the husband and wife as a legal unity than upon prac- 
tical analysis of contemporary personal injury litigation. In addi- 
tion, the Potemkin village quality of carrier-insured privity mili- 
tates against automatically binding an insured by an issue 
previously resolved against a carrier. Where issue preclusion 
against an insured is predicated upon determinations made in 
earlier litigation controlled and conducted by the carrier, re- 
newed litigation of issues should only be barred upon the court's 
specific finding that the insured's motive and opportunity to 
contest the issue previously concluded was, in the context of the 
particular suit, coextensive with that of the carrier. Lastly, to 
the extent that workers' compensation findings purport to de- 
cide issues of design or formulation defect, warning adequacy, 
degree of risk, or product identification, such findings should not 
be given issue preclusive effect in later products liability or toxic 
tort claims against a manufacturer or seller. 
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